October, 20-27, 2022 | Issue 23 - Weapons & Tactics
Yannik Hunold, Isaiah Johnson, Martina Sclaverano, W&T
Argyrios Chatziilias, Editor; Demetrios Giannakaris, Senior Editor
Mahamat Idriss Deby during a visit in Chad[1]
Date: October 20, 2022
Location: N’Djamena, Chad
Parties involved: Citizens of Chad; President of the Transitional Military Council of Chad Mahamat Idriss Deby; Chadian Police Forces; Civil Society Group Wakit Tamma
The event: On October 20, Chadian citizens protested in the capital N’Djamena after the president’s son, Mahamat Idriss Deby, announced that elections would be delayed. Deby came into power in April 2021 and initially promised an eighteen-month transitional period before elections. Protesters barricaded roads and set fire to government buildings, resulting in 4 deaths near the US embassy. Amnesty International accused Chadian police forces of human rights abuses after the government imposed a curfew, declared a state of emergency, and repressed several political parties.[2] In August, the Chadian government signed peace pacts with several rebel groups, but one of the largest groups, Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), refused to participate.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
The Deby government will likely use the state of emergency to bypass democratic procedures and enforce a repressive regime. The government will likely use violent means, like tear gas, armored vehicles, and water cannons, to suppress protests. There is a roughly even chance of Deby entirely banning protests in the capital and increasing the requirements to own firearms to reduce the threat posed by large protests like Thursday’s. It is likely that Deby's decision to postpone the elections will likely add to the momentum of the movement and attract more protesters.
The UN is likely to denounce human rights abuses and has a roughly even chance of enacting economic sanctions. The Chadian government will likely try to control the population by threatening not to accept international aid if the protests do not stop. Foreign journalists will likely be expelled or arrested to control the country's public image. Political opponents of the current Chadian government will likely flee the country and almost certainly be excluded from positions of power.
The Chadian rebel groups that signed peace accords with the Deby government will very likely withdraw from the agreement. A lack of diplomatic dialogue between the factions will likely result in armed conflict and lead citizens to acquire more arms. It is very likely that disaffected citizens will actively seek to join opposition groups resisting the military government. Failed peace accords and government human rights violations will almost certainly undermine future treaties between the Chadian government and rebel groups.
Date: October 21, 2022
Location: Al-Dhabba oil terminal, al-Shihr, Hadhramaut province, Yemen
Parties involved: Yemeni government; Saudi Arabia; United Arab Emirates (UAE); Houthi forces; Iran; Yemeni oil drilling and refinery industry
The event: Houthi drones tried to attack an oil terminal in the south of Yemen, but they were intercepted by Yemeni forces and caused no damage to the port. This is the first escalation of the conflict between Houthis and Yemeni authorities since the truce was signed in early October 2022. Yemeni authorities are supported by a coalition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE government, while Iran supports Houthis.[4]
Analysis & Implications:
There is a roughly even chance that Houthis will conduct other attacks on Yemeni territory with suicide drones and other unmanned weapons supplied by Iran. Houthis will likely attempt to acquire more advanced drones to bypass the Yemeni defense systems in response to their drones being shot down. There is a roughly even chance the Houthis will require technical assistance for more efficient drone strikes. Iran has a roughly even chance of sharing intelligence with the Houthis regarding Yemeni tanker movements.
In the immediate aftermath of this incident, oil importers are unlikely to harbor in Yemeni ports to avoid further drone strikes on similar facilities. This will likely harm the Yemeni economy in the short term, very likely forcing Yemen to keep relying on Saudi Arabia and UAE for economic and military aid. There will likely be international diplomatic efforts to re-establish a truce between the fighting parties, but these will likely be sabotaged by the Houthis attempting to destabilize Yemeni forces.
The Counterterrorism Group (CTG)
[1] Official Visit of H.E General Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, Chairman of the Transitional Military Council and President of the Republic of Chad, by Paul Kagame, licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
[2] Chad signs peace pact with rebels, but main insurgents stay out, Reuters, August 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chad-police-fire-tear-gas-pro-democracy-protests-2022-10-20/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chad-rebels-sign-peace-deal-2022-08-08/
[4] Yemeni government forces intercept Houthi drones attacking southern oil terminal, Reuters, October