A SUDANESE OFFICIAL ACCUSED THE RSF OF OPERATING A UAE-SUPPORTED MILITARY TRAINING CAMP IN ETHIOPIA AND LIBYAN AUTHORITIES ARRESTED INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH DRONE ATTACKS ON ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
September 03-09, 2026 | Issue 36 - AFRICOM
Katherine Sanchez, Sasha Sánchez, Blaise Liess II, Eduardo Velázquez Jurado, Mackenzie LaCombe, Cora Jordan, Amelia Bell, Sophie Rieckmann
Giovanni Lamberti, Editor; Jennifer Loy, Chief Editor
Military Training Camp[1]
Date: September 3, 2026
Location: Sudan
Parties involved: Sudanese President General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan; Sudan; Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); SAF’s 4th Infantry Division; Sudanese official; Kurmuk commissioner Abdelati Mohamed El Faki; infantry troops; opposing Sudanese paramilitary force Rapid Support Forces (RSF); opposing Sudanese paramilitary force Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N); militant groups; militias; Ethiopia; UAE; UAE military
The event: A Sudanese official accused the RSF of operating UAE-backed military training camps inside Ethiopia.[2]
Analysis & Implications:
Public accusations that Ethiopia hosts RSF camps will very likely reinforce a transnational logistical corridor sustained by UAE military cargo air bridges, likely allowing the RSF to continue its military expansion into the Blue Nile State. Establishing this zone will very likely provide the RSF with rear bases safeguarded from enemy threat, likely enabling expansion of SAF key infrastructure across the southeast, such as depots around Ed Damazin. An increase in RSF capabilities such as sustained drone reconnaissance and precision strikes will likely degrade the SAF’s defensive operability around Ed Damazin, reinforcing RSF occupation into agricultural and transit corridors on northern SAF-held areas. The RSF presence in these critical transit hubs will very likely isolate SAF outposts across southeastern Sudan from their central supply hubs, likely forcing the SAF to divert forces and equipment from Khartoum to prevent encirclement tactics.
The positioning of UAE-backed military camps in Ethiopia will likely provide safe havens for RSF forces retreating from contested regions, likely increasing force parity between the RSF and SAF. Ethiopia's sovereignty will very likely deter SAF strikes on the camps, likely granting the RSF a protected rear area for reconstitution and unit rotation unavailable in the Darfur region. Protected camps will likely allow the RSF to conduct more sophisticated and extended training exercises not previously sustainable in Sudan, likely allowing for deeper recruit specialization and increased cohesion between militias. More diverse occupation specialization and unified force objectives will likely enable new RSF attack methods and tactics, likely narrowing the capability gap with the SAF.
The RSF and SPLM-N capture of the town of Geissan will very likely allow the militant groups to control and seize key access corridors leading to the nearby Roseires Dam. RSF and SPLM-N control of the dam will very likely allow for the disruption of water releases, likely degrading irrigated agricultural output from the breadbasket regions of al-Jazirah, Sennar, and Khartoum during dry seasons. The famine-risk scenario will very likely force the SAF to reallocate infantry troops and establish longer patrols around the Roseires, Sennar, and Merowe Dams’ perimeters for protection. Defending the dams in the Blue Nile State will very likely lock the SAF into a defensive posture, granting the RSF and SPLM-N operational capabilities to push towards central Sudan.
Date: September 7, 2026
Location: Tripoli, Libya
Parties involved: Libyan Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah; Libya; Libyan National Army (LNA); Libyan authorities; security forces; Libyan interim UN-backed government Government of National Accord (GNA); UN-recognized Government of National Unity (GNU); foreign nationals; militias; suspects
The event: Libyan authorities arrested five suspects, including foreign nationals, linked to a series of drone-sabotage activities on energy facilities.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
Increased drone attacks will very likely raise demand for advanced intelligence gathering and defensive weapon technology, likely straining limited high-technology resources and reducing the effectiveness of critical infrastructure operations. The resulting gap in conventional weapons access, compounded by the UN arms embargo on Libya, will likely pressure the GNA and LNA to adopt high-end technology domestic production despite unpredictable maintenance and software support. The GNA and LNA will likely independently address the gap in weapons access and critical infrastructure security strength by supplementing international resources with investments in domestic weapon proliferation and development, reducing their dependence on external security support.
Local militias fighting for control over Zawyia will very likely continue to rely on external expertise from foreign drone operators to escalate attacks against oil and energy infrastructure. This deeper operational alignment will likely enable more sophisticated and harder-to-attribute strikes on energy infrastructure. Once a militia embeds foreign drone expertise in their operations, that expertise will very likely spread to rival factions through knowledge and component sharing, likely decoupling drone sabotage attacks from single-actor attribution sources. The GNU will very likely face significant challenges in combating any single group’s capabilities, as strikes against Zawiya’s energy infrastructure will likely reflect the increasingly self-sufficient and multi-actor nature of drone usage.
[1] Military Base, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)
[2] Sudanese official says RSF running UAE-backed camps inside Ethiopia, Sudan Tribune, September 2026
[3] Libya arrests five people in connection with drone strikes on refinery, Africa News, September 2026 https://www.africanews.com/2026/09/07/libya-arrests-five-peopLibyanLibyanle-in-connection-with-drone-strikes-on-refinery/
