ATTACKERS TARGETED THE BAKIN RUWA-MAJE BORDER CHECKPOINT IN NIGERIA, AND THE SUDANESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT-NORTH ACCUSED THE SUDANESE ARMED FORCES OF KILLING CIVILIANS IN A DRONE STRIKE

March 5-11, 2026 | Issue 10 - AFRICOM Team

Antonio De Rosa, Bhavya Jain, Blaise Liess II, Insa Reblin, Cora Jordan, Amelia Bell, Ludovica Leccese, Maxime De Crop, Alexandra Valdez, Sasha Sánchez, Mackenzie LaCombe, Giovanni Lamberti

Elizabeth Fignar, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

Kebbi, Nigeria, and Surrounding Area^[1]

Date: March 5, 2026

Location: Bagudu Local Government Area, Kebbi State, Nigeria

Parties involved: Nigeria; security forces; police officers; Burkina Faso; Mali; Niger; Benin; Benin and Niger riverine communities; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Sahelian states; Sahelian state militaries; West African state militaries; armed groups; armed assailants; insurgent groups; insurgents;  factions; individual countries

The event: A large group of armed assailants attacked the Bakin Ruwa–Maje border checkpoint, killing two police officers.^[2]

Analysis & Implications:

• Armed assailants will very likely continue targeting the Bakin Ruwa–Maje border as a tactical choice to exploit its geographical features. The borders’ expanse, surrounding unpoliced forests, and isolated hills will very likely provide cover for insurgent groups, likely enabling future attacks by allowing them to go unnoticed. Attacks against vulnerable soft state border checkpoints near similar terrain will very likely increase as the insurgent groups refine their tactical abilities, such as bush-navigation and wetland maneuvering. In the long term, this will likely create a multiplier effect where terrain facilitates the persistent growth of insurgent groups' presence in the north-western Nigerian region.

• Attacking the security forces guarding a key border passage, insurgents very likely aim to transform military presence into resource control and financial gains. Armed groups will likely use drone surveillance to monitor the movement of security forces along the Bakin Ruwa–Maje border corridor, likely planning hit-and-run attacks, to prove their de facto control of the trade routes connecting Kebbi to Benin and the Niger riverine communities. The transformation of these corridors into ungoverned borderlands where armed groups move freely will likely facilitate the unhindered flow of illicit trade, allowing armed assailants to monopolize revenue streams like fuel trafficking. There is a roughly even chance that armed groups will implement a parallel trade and tax collection system, likely to develop a shadow administrative control in rural areas.

• This attack likely demonstrates a lack of security coordination between West African state militaries and Sahelian state militaries that will likely reinforce a permissive environment for local insurgent groups. The separation of Sahelian states from ECOWAS will likely lead to disagreements in counterinsurgency methodology and mutual distrust, likely emboldening insurgent groups and facilitating the increase in kinetic activity. With this split, regional security operations will likely continue to lack cohesion, likely leaving individual countries open to similar attacks in the long term. Isolated state responses will likely be insufficient in addressing the multi-national insurgency, as factions will likely continue to capitalize on unaligned objectives and move freely across the borders of Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

Date: March 8, 2026

Location: Diling, South Kordofan State, Sudan

Parties involved: official national military Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); fighters; Sudanese paramilitary group fighting the government Rapid Support Forces (RSF); RSF-allied paramilitary group Sudanese People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N); RSF-led alliance with the SPLM-N Ta’asis alliance; Ta’asis fighters; armed actors; local networks;  civilians; US Africa Command (USAFRICOM)

The event: SPLM-N accused SAF of conducting a drone strike targeting and killing 17 civilians.^[3]

Analysis & Implications:

• The targeting of civilian infrastructure by the SAF and the Ta’asis alliance will very likely increase tactics of economic resource weaponization, likely sustaining each’s longevity by redirecting supplies to fighters rather than civilians in need. Both groups will very likely exploit individual operational strengths, such as SAF’s bureaucratic control and Ta’asis fighters’ use of force, to harness available resources. The SAF and Ta’asis alliance’s restriction of access to food, fuel, and humanitarian aid will likely deepen civilian dependency on these groups, likely leveraging political and territorial control. These armed actors very likely foster the volatile status quo to gain resource-led benefits, likely undermining any civilian-led stabilization efforts by weakening community resilience and hindering long-term infrastructure capabilities.

• SPLM-N’s declarations likely show opportunistic alignment with the RSF narrative against the SAF, aimed to foster limited, ad-hoc cooperation with RSF in the region against a common enemy. This shared opposition will likely encourage coordinated operations across urban and rural areas of South Kordofan, with RSF likely contributing drones and heavy artillery suited for urban offensives while SPLM-N leverages its long-standing territorial presence and local networks to sustain operations in rural areas. Diverging views within the Ta’asis alliance regarding territorial authority and the SPLM-N’s preference for maintaining operational autonomy will likely lead to a division of roles between the two groups rather than a unified command chain. This territorial division will likely produce a dispersed multi-front battlespace, likely undermining USAFRICOM’s ability to monitor, attribute, and respond to insecurity in the region.

• The drone attack conducted by the SAF will likely prompt the Ta’asis alliance’s need to prioritize domestic drone production to limit dependency on standard foreign supplies, very likely increasing customizable solutions. The localized UAV production will very likely allow for faster terrain adaptability modifications, as these systems evolve in response to on-site conditions. The shift towards local production will likely accelerate technological adaptation by bypassing international procurement delays, very likely allowing real-time capability enhancements based on direct combat experience. Real-time technology adaptability will likely contribute to a high-intensity proximity war, with SAF infrastructures facing increasing drone strikes on strategic sites such as the Al-Altrun airbase.

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[1] Kebbi, Nigeria and Surrounding Area by Google Maps

[2] Gunmen attack police checkpoint in Kebbi, kill two officers, Daily Post Nigeria, March 2026, https://dailypost.ng/2026/03/05/gunmen-attack-police-checkpoint-in-kebbi-kill-two-officers/ 

[3] SPLM-N says army drone strike kills 17 in South Kordofan, Sudan Tribune, March 2026, https://sudantribune.com/article/31150