PSA: STRIKES AND A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS CRIPPLE EL FASHER, SUDAN; INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE NEEDED TO OPEN SAFE PASSAGE FOR NECESSARY AID
- Senior Editor
- 4 minutes ago
- 10 min read
Aldara Carballal Presas, Andrew Britland, Jeffrey Glibowski, Natalie Goldwasser, Camilla Montemarano WATCH/GSOC Team
Jackie Heier, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor
October 12, 2025
Humanitarian Aid for Displaced People[1]
Introduction
Since April 2024, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have besieged El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State, Sudan. The siege has displaced over 600,000 people, half of whom are children, from El Fasher and its surrounding camps in recent months.[2] Approximately 260,000 civilians, including 130,000 children, remained in the city without humanitarian aid for over 16 months.[3] The UN reports violations against children, including killing, maiming, abduction, and sexual violence in homes, displacement camps, and marketplaces.[4] Healthcare supplies will likely run out under current conditions, very likely leading to higher mortality rates among children and pregnant women. Highly populated locations will likely remain a growing target for drone strikes, very likely increasing civilian casualties. Humanitarian organizations should establish stronger networks of information sharing on the ground and focus negotiations on establishing a safe corridor for humanitarian aid into El Fasher.
Summary
Sudan’s RSF has been fighting against the Sudanese army for control of the western Darfur region,[5] and besieged El Fasher to seize the Sudanese army’s last major regional stronghold.[6] RSF has specifically targeted the ethnic Massalit, Zaghawa, and non-Arab people.[7] In June 2024, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed a UNSC resolution that called on RSF to end the siege.[8] For 16 months, RSF has blocked aid to civilians, destroyed hospitals, and conducted operations resulting in civilian injuries and casualties.[9] Due to RSF attacks, UN aid convoys and assets are difficult and unsafe for the delivery of assistance.[10] The armed group has employed blockade tactics,[11] constructed berms, planted mines and IEDs, and fought on numerous front lines, making it difficult and costly to provide aid to civilians.[12] According to the UN, delivering a single shipment of aid to civilians in El Fasher has at times required five days and six different modes of transportation.[13]
Medical and nutritional services have nearly collapsed, leaving an estimated 6,000 children with severe acute malnutrition untreated as supply lines remain cut off and health facilities are overwhelmed.[14] Pregnant women lack access to healthcare facilities, preventing many from reaching hospitals in time, if at all.[15] Civilians who are seeking healthcare walk or ride donkeys through violence to reach aid workers.[16] The lack of food access poses a threat to pregnant women and increases complications for their children.[17] According to the UN Children Fund (UNICEF), in August, medical personnel treated more than 10,000 children for severe acute malnutrition.[18] The same month, within a single week, at least 63 people, mostly women and children, died of malnutrition.[19] Malnutrition makes children more vulnerable to waterborne diseases like cholera.[20] Sudan is facing the worst cholera outbreak civilians have experienced, leading to 5,000 cases and 98 deaths in Darfur.[21]
Civilians who attempt to flee the region face systematic abduction, robbery, sexual assault, and killing as a tactic of war.[22] Escapees report it being safer to stay in El Fasher than attempting to flee, despite daily casualties.[23] Reports from August indicate that a minimum of 23 children suffered rape, gang rape, or sexual assault.[24] Over a 5-week period, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported receiving over 300 survivors of sexual violence, increasing the total number of unknown victims.[25] Of sexual assault victims treated by MSF between January and March, 56% said they were assaulted by a non-civilian, 34% were attacked while attempting to collect food, and 31% were under the age of 18.[26]
RSF has conducted drone strikes in populous areas.[27] On September 19, 2025, the group struck a mosque in a displacement camp in El Fasher during morning prayers,[28] killing 75 civilians. Many others were trapped under the rubble from the destroyed building.[29] International organizations, such as MSF, had already withdrawn from El Fasher and nearby areas,[30] leaving civilians with less access to assistance.[31] On September 23, 2025, RSF attacked a market in El Fasher with a drone strike,[32] killing 15 people and wounding 12 others.[33] In recent weeks, RSF drones have systematically targeted small shops and markets to destroy food supplies.[34]
This armed group is restricting the flow of information amid connectivity blackouts, a fractured media ecosystem, and the politicization of communication channels.[35] The RSF has employed tactical communications blackouts, most notably in February 2024 when 50 million people were unable to contact the outside world.[36] To control the flow of information, the government has shut down internet connectivity on numerous occasions.[37] Increasing persecution and censorship of journalists, and the establishment of state-controlled media sources, have limited the amount of unbiased and accurate information coming out of Sudan.[38]
Historically, religious leaders have carried influence and a high status within Sudan, playing a critical role in decision-making.[39] Since the beginning of the civil war in 2023, RSF has been targeting religious leaders and sites, especially those of Christian faith, with over 165 Christian churches closed as a result of bombings and raids.[40] RSF and SAF forces have hit densely populated areas for attacks, which often include mosques despite their religious alignment with the Islamic faith.[41] Within this context, religious dialogue grounded in maqāṣid al-sharīʿa (the objectives of sharī’a), specifically in the ḥifẓ al-nafs (preservation of life), remains a central moral reference across Sunni muslim and broader Islamic ethical frameworks.[42]
Analysis
The RSF’s pattern of attacks on civilian areas, hospitals, and displacement camps likely reflects an intentional campaign of collective punishment and ethnic targeting of non-Arab, especially the Zaghawa people, to consolidate territorial control across North Darfur. This strategy will likely benefit the RSF in displacing the civilians that they perceive as hostile. The presence of ethnic and religious targeting will very likely make it harder to end the siege, as RSF forces likely seek territorial control of El Fasher without religious and ethnic diversity. RSF will very likely continue to block humanitarian aid that would help minority communities.
The RSF’s ongoing siege of El Fasher will almost certainly deepen food insecurity and malnutrition. Blocked aid routes, targeted attacks on markets, and looting of relief supplies will almost certainly continue to prevent humanitarian deliveries and erode local food systems. This siege likely represents the group’s economic and humanitarian control over the area, very likely using starvation as a weapon of war. The lack of sanitation and clean water will very likely contribute to the spread of cholera and other diseases. This condition will likely increase mortality rates and children’s susceptibility to disease outbreaks.
Without access to healthcare supplies, the few remaining hospitals will likely run out of the supplies needed to treat pregnant women. Pregnant women will very likely resort to giving birth without support in unsanitary conditions, likely increasing the rates of severe bleeding, infection after childbirth, and maternal mortality rates. Starvation will very likely exacerbate the risks of home pregnancies, as women will likely have weaker immune systems that make them more susceptible to infections. In the event of a ceasefire or the end of the siege, starvation and infection-linked deaths will very likely persist until ample humanitarian aid is provided.
Rates of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases and infections will likely increase as sexual violence is continually employed as a tactic of war. Women in El Fasher live in displacement camps where they very likely have to shower and sleep in public areas, which likely increases the threat of sexual assault. Women are likely at higher risk of gender based violence (GBV) when collecting aid and going to the displacement camps. Fear of sexual assault very likely deters women from accessing displacement camps with food aid, likely increasing malnutrition among women.
Drone strikes targeting populated areas will very likely prevent civilians from engaging in social life. Civilians will very likely fear gathering in religious places such as mosques, which will likely decrease their ability to practice their religion as a community. Civilians will very likely have fewer opportunities to interact with others since they will likely avoid public spaces such as markets. Fewer interactions will likely weaken El Fasher’s civil society, which very likely makes it harder for civilians to work together to request aid or defend themselves from the RSF.
The repeated targeting of several displacement camps in close proximity to North Darfur almost certainly fragments community networks, very likely reducing the population’s ability to reestablish a stable livelihood. Those affected will very likely flee to overcrowded camps seeking refuge, thereby increasing the scarcity of humanitarian aid. This continued ethnic targeting will likely escalate social divisions, increase retaliation efforts, and prevent any cooperation to form unified governance in Darfur.
Drone strikes targeting infrastructure will likely dismantle the remaining economic system. Civilians will likely stop frequenting shops and markets, which will very likely prevent sellers from running their shops. Civilians will very likely decrease their input into the economy. A weaker economic situation will very likely make it harder for El Fasher to rebuild homes and markets after the conflict, reducing access to food, supplies, and income sources. Without infrastructure, including roads, homes, schools, markets, hospitals, and government buildings, conflict will likely continue even after a ceasefire. The country will unlikely be able to provide civilians with the services required for daily life, which will likely exacerbate existing divisions as people and groups fight over available resources.
Faith and local leaders likely hold more influence in the region than political figures. Their status very likely gives them credibility among civilians and armed groups, likely making them better suited to build trusting relations to reduce violence and open aid supply routes in the future. As the conflict persists, religious sites and leaders will very likely continue experiencing disproportionate violence and attacks, especially Christian sites and leaders. Christian leaders engaging in humanitarian dialogue will unlikely be able to effectively create safe zones despite efforts, as a result of indiscriminate violence against civilians from the RSF in El Fasher. Sunni muslim leaders, especially those using maqāṣid al-sharīʿa teachings, will have a roughly even chance of engaging in more successful dialogue than Christian leaders.
Recommendations
The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) recommends that local organizations focus on negotiation efforts with RSF, allowing local relief organizations to create safe corridors to deliver humanitarian aid to El Fasher. Since RSF does not recognize resolutions to the siege, the UN should use coordinated international diplomatic and economic pressure to emphasize the immediate need for the delivery of healthcare supplies to pregnant women and children, and the supply of food and water.
Humanitarian networks and NGOs, including UNICEF, World Food Program (WFP), and CARE International, should enhance communications with El Fasher by developing reporting channels to identify unreachable areas and operational hospitals in times of crisis. They should deploy emergency alert systems such as local radio networks, phone and text-based platforms, and mobile applications to help civilians organize safe passage, request aid and resources, and report emergency needs in areas with limited internet availability. The UNSC should support the establishment of a special tribunal under the International Criminal Court (ICC) to strengthen efforts to ensure accountability for war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Sudan, including the use of starvation as a weapon of war. A special ICC tribunal should support independent investigations and international justice mechanisms, which are essential to deterring further violations and upholding international humanitarian law.
Regional actors like the African Union (AU), the Arab League, and religious leaders should focus on local relations in Sudan to mediate temporary aid delivery and grant additional access to humanitarian resources. These actors should leverage religious dialogue rooted in maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, particularly ḥifẓ al-nafs (preservation of life), and could promote an alignment with humanitarian access, with the local religious morals that connect the public. These actors should facilitate community-level negotiations to create safe corridors for aid convoys and temporary humanitarian pauses. Engaging trusted local and regional leaders and faith networks should reduce the risk of diverting aid and increase public trust in the delivery process.
[1] Humanitarian Aid, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)
[2] “After 500 days under siege, children in Sudan’s Al Fasher face starvation, mass displacement, and deadly violence,” UN Children Fund, August 26, 2025, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/after-500-days-under-siege-children-sudans-al-fasher-face-starvation-mass
[3] Besieged city in Sudan has become ‘an epicentre of child suffering,’ UNICEF warns, AP, August 27, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/sudan-war-military-rsf-darfur-el-fasher-a1fa65cfd28c716a625bd4687c84eec6
[4] After 500 days under siege, children in Sudan’s Al Fasher face starvation, mass displacement, and deadly violence, UN Children Fund, August 26, 2025, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/after-500-days-under-siege-children-sudans-al-fasher-face-starvation-mass
[5] At least seven killed, 71 wounded as Sudan's RSF paramilitaries shell besieged city, France 24, August 31, 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20250831-at-least-seven-killed-71-wounded-as-sudan-s-rsf-shells-besieged-city
[6] Ibid
[7] Sudan: Ethnic Cleansing in West Darfur, Human Rights Watch, May 9, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/09/sudan-ethnic-cleansing-west-darfur
[8] Security Council demands end to siege of El Fasher in Sudan, UN News, June 13, 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/06/1151031#:~:text=13%20June%202024%20Peace%20and,save%20lives%2C%E2%80%9D%20she%20said
[9] Besieged city in Sudan has become ‘an epicentre of child suffering,’ UNICEF warns, AP, August 27, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/sudan-war-military-rsf-darfur-el-fasher-a1fa65cfd28c716a625bd4687c84eec6
[10] Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General - on Sudan, UN Sudan, August 29, 2025, https://sudan.un.org/en/300675-statement-attributable-spokesman-secretary-general-sudan
[11] 'Our children are dying': Rare footage shows plight of civilians in besieged Sudan city, BBC, August 14, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czxp0qyn6dqo
[12] UN warns of ‘catastrophic’ humanitarian crisis in Sudan’s Darfur, UN News, October 3, 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166028
[13] Ibid
[14] After 500 days under siege, children in Sudan’s Al Fasher face starvation, mass displacement, and deadly violence, UN Children Fund, August 26, 2025, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/after-500-days-under-siege-children-sudans-al-fasher-face-starvation-mass
[15] Sudan: Pregnant Women’s Fate in Darfur, Médecins Sans Frontières, March 28, 2025, https://msfsouthasia.org/sudan-pregnant-womens-fate-in-darfur/
[16] Paramilitary drone attack on a mosque in Sudan kills at leaa st 70 people, army says, AP, September 19, 2025 https://apnews.com/article/sudan-elfasher-famine-displacement-war-mosque-b5d5a02d4e850fd4c9687717648fc092
[17] Ibid
[18] Malnutrition in Darfur’s besieged el-Fasher city kills 23 people55 weeks weeks in a month, AP, September 26, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/sudan-dafur-malnutrition-deaths-82eeee30439a90be55cf6c3493508834
[19] Ibid
[20] Over 500 days of siege: Women and girls trapped in El Fasher face the risk of starvation and death, UN Women, September 2, 2025, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/statement/2025/09/over-500-days-of-siege-women-and-girls-trapped-in-el-fasher-face-the-risk-of-starvation-and-death
[21] Ibid
[22] Ibid
[23] Joint Statement: Safe Passage: Protection for Civilians Under Siege in El Fasher, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, October 1, 2025, https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/joint-statement-safe-paa ssage-protection-for-civilians-under-siege-in-el-fasher/ ,
[24] After 500 days under siege, children in Sudan’s Al Fasher face starvation, mass displacement, and deadly violence, UN Children Fund, August 26, 2025, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/after-500-days-under-siege-children-sudans-al-fasher-face-starvation-mass#:~:text=The%20toll%20on%20children%20is,exponentially%20higher%20risk%20of%20death.
[25] Sudan: Civilians targeted by systematic sexual violence, Médecins Sans Frontières, September 25, 2025, https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/sudan-civilians-targeted-systematic-sexual-violence
[26] Sexual violence in Sudan: “They beat us and they raped us right there on the road in public,Médecins Sans Frontières, May 28, 2025, https://www.msf.org/sexual-violence-sudan-%E2%80%9Cthey-beat-us-and-they-raped-us-right-there-road-public%E2%80%9D
[27] Drone strike on a market in Sudan kills 15, aid worker and local group say, AP, September 24, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/sudan-rapid-support-forces-darfur-market-war-96a0496aa54900a67f5aeb28a4ab1807
[28] Paramilitary drone attack on a mosque in Sudan kills at least 70 people, army says, AP, September 19, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/sudan-elfasher-famine-displacement-war-mosque-b5d5a02d4e850fd4c9687717648fc092
[29] Ibid
[30] “Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot: Al Fasher and Zamzam (As of 8 April 2025),” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, April 2025,
[31] Ibid
[32] Drone strike on a market in Sudan kills 15, aid worker and local group say, AP, September 24, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/sudan-rapid-support-forces-darfur-market-war-96a0496aa54900a67f5aeb28a4ab1807
[33] Ibid
[34] RSF drone strike on El Fasher market kills and injures over 27 civilians, Sudan Tribune, September 2025,
[35] “Sudan’s information war: How weaponised online narratives shape the humanitarian crisis and response,” Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities Network,
[36] Sudanese left in the dark by RSF-imposed telecoms blackout, Reuters, February 12, 2024 https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-left-dark-by-rsf-imposed-telecoms-blackout-2024-02-12/
[37] Sudan, Reporters sans frontières, 2025 https://rsf.org/en/country/sudan
[38] Ibid
[39] Religion of Sudan, Britannica, October 4, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Sudan/Religion
[41] Ibid
[42] Al-Zuḥaylī, M. “Al-Wajīz fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh al-Islāmī,” Dār al-Kha,yr, 2006 (Translated by Google)