PSA: UN CONFIRMS MASS GRAVES AND ABUSES AT STABILIZATION SUPPORT APPARATUS DETENTION SITES IN LIBYA AS AUTHORITIES RESTRICT FORENSIC TEAMS’ ACCESS; INDEPENDENT ACCESS NEEDED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Jacqueline Heier, Vitaliy Nabukhotny, WATCH/GSOC Team

Sakura Morales, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

June 15, 2025

Libya[1]

Introduction

On May 18-21, 2025, the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR) investigators discovered over 80 bodies in mass graves, some burned, buried, or decomposed in hospital refrigerators at sites run by the Stabilization Support Apparatus (SSA), a state-affiliated armed group in Tripoli.[2] UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk confirmed that investigators uncovered instruments of torture and potential evidence of extrajudicial killings at SSA-run detention facilities, which UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) had identified as likely sites of such abuses.[3] Despite these findings, Libyan officials have denied forensic teams access to the sites, raising concerns that key forensic evidence may be lost or manipulated, undermining future prosecutions.[4] The Government of National Unity (GNU) authorized SSA through formal appointments, allowing it to operate despite Amnesty International’s documented record of abuse.[5] According to human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs)[6] and foreign governments,[7] GNU-aligned armed groups, such as SSA and the Internal Security Agency (ISA),[8] and rival non-state actors, including the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and Kaniyat, are responsible for systematic human rights abuses in Libya.[9] These abuses include extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearance, and lack of judicial guarantees, as documented by Amnesty International,[10] Human Rights Watch,[11] and OHCHR.[12] GNU will very likely continue obstructing accountability efforts by delaying forensic access and restricting independent investigations to avoid exposing its links to SSA abuses. State-backed paramilitarism almost certainly remains a central driver of Libya’s ongoing human rights crisis. The continued obstruction of forensic investigations will very likely undermine future legal proceedings against SSA by compromising critical evidence needed to identify victims and prosecute perpetrators of torture and extrajudicial killings. International institutions, such as OHCHR and the International Criminal Court (ICC), will unlikely improve the accountability efforts and human rights situation in Libya, considering weak central control, armed groups' influence, and their willingness to maintain the status quo. These dynamics will very likely allow SSA-linked abuses to continue without legal consequences and further weaken Libya’s transitional justice prospects.

Summary

Since the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya has experienced persistent instability, linked to the emergence of rival administrations and the growth of armed groups operating with minimal state oversight.[13] GNU, Libya's internationally recognized government based in Tripoli, has formally authorized militias such as SSA, granting them state legitimacy despite their documented human rights abuses.[14] LAAF, GNU’s rivals in Libya, alongside government-authorized security forces, control the eastern and southern parts of the country.[15] The existence of dual legislative and judicial authorities between GNU in the west and LAAF in the east deepens Libya’s political divide, as both operate separate courts, prosecution offices, and law enforcement bodies, resulting in conflicting rulings, fragmented legal authority, and persistent obstacles to national accountability efforts.[16] Libya’s ongoing human rights crisis worsened after the May 12, 2025, killing of SSA leader Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, also known as Gheniwa.[17] Following his death, armed clashes occurred between SSA and rival armed state-affiliated groups, such as the Joint Operations Force (JOF) and the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Crime and Terrorism, which resulted in casualties, including at least six dead in the Abu Salim neighborhood and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure.[18] These confrontations led to widespread unrest in Tripoli, where protesters condemned militia rule and demanded accountability for ongoing abuses.[19] In response, GNU security forces repeatedly used force to disperse protests, resulting in civilian deaths and damage to essential infrastructure, including hospitals.[20] Around the same period, UN and Libyan authorities investigators discovered multiple mass grave sites linked to SSA-run detention facilities.[21] On May 13, 2025, GNU announced it had taken control of all SSA headquarters.[22] Libyan authorities have cracked down on civic space and political opposition, using arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killings to stifle dissent since the termination of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya’s (FFM) mandate in 2023.[23] 

On June 4, 2025, OHCHR confirmed the discovery of human remains at multiple official and unofficial detention sites linked to SSA, including SSA headquarters, hospital morgues, and a burial site at the Tripoli Zoo.[24] Investigators discovered bodies in various conditions, some charred, others buried or left to decompose in refrigerators at Al Khadra and Abu Salim hospitals.[25] The identities of many victims remain unknown, and investigators found suspected instruments of torture and evidence of extrajudicial killings at the sites.[26] SSA, officially created by GNU in 2021, had long been suspected of operating unofficial detention centers in Tripoli with a record of abusive practices against migrants and political detainees.[27] UN bodies frequently cited these facilities for enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture.[28] Though SSA is nominally a state body, it often acts autonomously, operates with minimal oversight and impunity, and functions more like a militia than a regulated security entity.[29] 

Despite the scale of these abuses, Libyan authorities have restricted access to mass grave sites and obstructed forensic teams’ ability to preserve evidence to delay accountability efforts,[30] raising UN and investigators' concerns that these delays will likely compromise the integrity of evidence necessary to identify victims and prosecute perpetrators.[31] GNU announced two investigative committees to review these incidents and examine detention practices, but rights groups question their independence.[32] Libyan authorities have pursued charges against some actors for torture and arbitrary detention. However, these limited efforts have almost entirely focused on low-level personnel, allowing most senior figures implicated in SSA-run abuses to avoid prosecution.[33] Human rights organizations continue to urge independent, transparent investigations, stressing that preserving evidence is crucial to establishing accountability and ending Libya’s entrenched impunity.[34] 

Migrants and refugees face elevated risks of abuse and exploitation in Libya’s fragmented detention system.[35] The International Organization for Migration (IOM) identified 824,131 migrants from 47 nationalities in Libya as of the end of 2024.[36] Many of these migrants face serious risks, as UN FFM and OHCHR have documented sexual violence, forced labor, and inhumane conditions in both official and unofficial detention centers in Libya, particularly affecting women and children.[37] The UN FFM reported that state actors, including SSA and DCIM personnel, systematically collaborated with smugglers and traffickers to intercept and detain migrants for financial gain.[38] Libyan authorities denied the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women and Girls access to detention facilities in eastern and western Libya during her visit in December 2022.[39] Armed groups such as SSA, along with the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), routinely collaborate with traffickers to intercept migrants at sea and return them to centers where they are detained indefinitely without legal oversight.[40] In 2024, IOM reported over 1,000 missing migrants and deaths.[41] Libyan authorities never officially registered many of these individuals, complicating efforts to identify remains in recently discovered mass graves.[42] 

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has repeatedly warned that Libya’s failure to pursue justice or reform its security institutions will prolong the country’s fragmentation and weaken public trust and international confidence in the government’s ability to uphold the rule of law, protect citizens’ rights, and establish legitimate national institutions.[43] Despite GNU reform announcements, such as the dissolution of DCIM, the state has failed to implement accountability measures for past crimes.[44] UN agencies continue to monitor conditions through remote reporting, survivor testimonies, and targeted site visits where permitted.[45] However, many detention centers remain inaccessible to investigators, particularly in southern and eastern Libya, where authorities under LAAF control frequently deny entry and do not permit the limited site visits negotiated with GNU authorities.[46] Human rights organizations have called for the creation of a robust international forensic task force and stronger legal frameworks to hold state-affiliated militias accountable.[47] In the past, UN bodies recommended transitional justice tools and supported Libya’s national human rights action plan to help deter future abuses and rebuild rule-of-law institutions.[48] Officials and armed militias’ impunity for crimes remains one of the primary human rights concerns in Libya.[49] In 2011, the UN Security Council (UNSC) referred the Libyan situation to the ICC and imposed an arms embargo on the country in response to the human rights situation.[50] Some states, including Russia, Egypt, and Turkey, violated the arms embargo, fueling the instability in Libya.[51] Since then, ICC exercises its jurisdiction over crimes committed in Libya or by its nationals.[52] As of June 2025, ICC holds seven arrest warrants against Libyan nationals related to abuses in Libya, including the members of the armed group from Tarhunah, also known as the Kani family.[53] In January 2025, Italy freed Osama Elmasry Njeem, a Libyan national under an ICC arrest warrant, due to a legal technicality after a short detention.[54] He immediately left for Libya afterward.[55] 

Analysis

Libya’s dual governance structure will likely sustain impunity for armed groups like SSA and ISA, as fragmented authorities will likely prioritize consolidating their own territorial power over establishing joint accountability mechanisms capable of addressing human rights violations. This fractured political environment will likely prevent the formation of a unified prosecutorial body capable of overseeing human rights violations across Libya’s east-west landscape, which will almost certainly allow armed groups to avoid judicial consequences while undermining confidence in the justice system. Victims of abuse will unlikely access a consistent and effective judicial process, almost certainly diminishing public confidence in state institutions. This dynamic will very likely deepen Libya’s political instability, stall reconciliation, and force transitional justice efforts to rely heavily on external mechanisms, such as ICC and OHCHR interventions, which will almost certainly remain limited without broader state cooperation.

The SSA dissolution likely promotes a temporary power vacuum among Tripoli-based armed groups, increasing the risk of renewed clashes that complicate efforts to secure mass grave sites and preserve evidence. Rival factions, such as JOF, LAAF, and Deterrence Apparatus for Combatting Terrorism, will very likely exploit the SSA’s dissolution to reposition themselves within Tripoli’s fragmented security hierarchy. These groups will likely compete for control over former SSA territories, detention facilities, and revenue-generating activities such as smuggling and extortion, which will likely allow them to expand their influence by strengthening their financial resources, consolidating control over security operations, and increasing their leverage in negotiations with political authorities. The instability resulting from these actors’ efforts to control former SSA territories will likely serve as justification for the GNU delays in allowing forensic access, citing security risks to obscure administrative obstruction. Although LAAF may seek to leverage GNU disarray to weaken its legitimacy, it will unlikely intervene militarily in the West due to international constraints. However, LAAF and other rival factions will likely use human rights narratives to politically discredit GNU efforts at transitional justice and portray themselves as more stable governance alternatives.  

Libyan authorities will very likely continue obstructing forensic access to SSA-run detention sites to shield state-linked actors and control the scope of investigations. GNU will very likely impose administrative delays and access restrictions that prevent external forensic teams from identifying victims or establishing responsibility. This obstruction will likely allow perpetrators time to sanitize sites, displace bodies, or alter physical evidence, almost certainly undermining the reliability of forensic results and reducing the investigators’ ability to link abuses to specific perpetrators. Authorities will likely justify delays on procedural grounds, such as citing persistent insecurity or jurisdictional fragmentation. They will likely simultaneously use the delays to reshape public narratives as international attention on mass graves increases. As obstruction persists, international actors, such as the ICC and EU governments, will unlikely intervene directly without a formal mandate authorized by the UNSC or through expanded cooperation agreements with Libyan authorities, which will likely prompt GNU officials to continue managing investigative timelines and avoid accountability. Even if external pressure intensifies, GNU authorities will unlikely initiate a transparent exhumation and documentation process voluntarily. Meaningful accountability will almost certainly require binding multilateral enforcement mechanisms capable of bypassing GNU obstruction, such as an ICC-authorized investigative team or UN-mandated forensic task force. However, these mechanisms will likely encounter political and logistical challenges during implementation. This ongoing obstruction will almost certainly deepen international criticism of the GNU’s commitment to transitional justice among organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and OHCHR.

The absence of independent forensic access will very likely weaken the ability of legal bodies to build credible prosecutions, allowing perpetrators to almost certainly evade accountability and leaving victims’ families without legal closure. This disruption will likely prevent domestic and international courts from building credible cases, very likely weakening the prospect of successful prosecutions. Over time, this pattern of state-facilitated obstruction will very likely erode Libya’s institutional legitimacy and damage public trust in future reconciliation processes, such as truth commissions, victim compensation mechanisms, or any UN-facilitated national dialogue efforts. Similar to OHCHR, ICC is unlikely to achieve results in prosecuting individuals under arrest warrants, as Kani family members and other suspects will almost certainly continue using their presence in Libya to evade capture. This will likely limit the ICC’s ability to deter future abuses and undermine the credibility of its enforcement efforts. Foreign governments, including EU member states, will very likely prioritize short-term concerns, such as regional security, counterterrorism, and migration control, and overlook or compromise with human rights abuses in Libya. This will likely delegitimize transitional justice mechanisms, especially among victims’ families and civil society actors who already perceive such processes as politicized or performative.

GNU will likely use investigative committees to signal accountability rather than pursue genuine judicial consequences for SSA leadership. These committees will very likely function as symbolic efforts to satisfy international pressure by giving external actors a political pretext to acknowledge minimal progress, even as substantive prosecutions likely remain absent. GNU will likely appoint individuals with limited authority, ensuring that investigations remain shallow and avoid implicating senior officials. This strategy will very likely allow the government to manage the release of sensitive information to shape public narratives and minimize reputational damage. Retaining control over investigative findings will almost certainly help shield senior officials from legal exposure in future accountability processes. If this pattern continues, it will almost certainly weaken public confidence in Libya’s legal system, as victims and civil society actors will likely perceive judicial processes as politicized, ineffective, and unable to hold state-linked militias accountable. Civil society groups and international partners will likely view these committees as ways to protect those in power rather than legitimately deliver justice. This will very likely increase existing distrust and lead victims and advocacy groups to shift their focus toward international accountability mechanisms rather than domestic transitional justice efforts. As a result, transitional justice efforts supported by GNU will very likely struggle to gain support from victims and affected communities. 

Migrants and refugees will very likely remain the primary victims of abuses in Libya’s detention infrastructure, and their legal and institutionalized marginalization, including lack of formal status, limited legal protections, and exclusion from investigative processes, will almost certainly continue to hinder accountability. As many very likely lack legal status, documentation, or relatives to advocate on their behalf, investigators will likely struggle to identify victims. Libyan security actors, such as SSA and DCIM, will very likely continue to target migrants to minimize risks, assessing that their undocumented status and lack of political leverage almost certainly limit sustained international accountability efforts. The lack of biometric data, identity records, or formal detention logs will almost certainly make it difficult to match remains in mass graves with missing individuals. This anonymity will likely reduce public pressure to resolve their cases, as the absence of identifiable victims will likely limit emotional resonance, media attention, and sustained advocacy. Reduced public scrutiny will likely allow perpetrators to evade prosecution, especially as migrants and refugees likely face racial bias, migration fatigue, and limited political prioritization among domestic actors such as GNU and LAAF, as well as some international actors, including EU member states. State collusion with trafficking networks, documented in FFM reports, will likely continue, especially if economic incentives remain unchanged. Until Libya adopts a national legal framework protecting migrant rights and international actors prioritize accountability for abuses against this group through mechanisms such as ICC-led prosecutions, targeted sanctions, or UN-mandated investigative missions, impunity will very likely persist. These violations will likely influence migrant perceptions of risk, leading some to view irregular migration as their only option for safety, particularly as limited legal pathways and ongoing instability very likely leave few viable alternatives for relocation.

The normalization of obstructive practices will almost certainly reinforce a culture of impunity within state-aligned armed groups, enabling mid-level commanders to authorize abuses without fear of legal consequences and undermining prospects for future judicial reform. Armed groups will very likely oppose international efforts aimed at accountability and investigations by refusing cooperation, obstructing access to detention sites, and intimidating witnesses, as these efforts threaten their consolidated security and political power. Rival groups such as LAAF will likely prioritize loyalty and control of territory over legal accountability, while GNU will very likely exploit jurisdictional divisions to shift blame and avoid responsibility for state-linked abuses. As a result, fragmented authorities almost certainly facilitate parallel systems of localized power, where armed groups regulate justice according to their interests and victims are excluded from formal remedies. The inability to prosecute those responsible will almost certainly embolden other armed groups, such as the LNA, ISA, and DCIM, to use SSA-similar tactics. These groups will likely relocate detainees before inspections, falsifying detention records, and concealing torture equipment, knowing that forensic manipulation very likely protects them from legal consequences. In response to continued impunity, armed groups will likely adapt concealment strategies, such as shifting burial sites to remote regions or trying to co-opt hospital staff, to delay detection and complicate future international investigations.

Recommendations

The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) recommends that foreign governments use diplomatic tools, such as high-level demarches, public joint statements, and withholding of non-humanitarian financial assistance, to pressure the Libyan authorities to investigate crimes and end impunity. International actors, including EU member states and UNSC, should impose targeted sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, against Libyan officials and state-aligned militia leaders for human rights abuses and those who obstruct forensic investigations or alter mass grave evidence. Foreign governments should enforce sanctions by leveraging border control measures and financial monitoring systems within their jurisdictions. They should coordinate diplomatic pressure to demand immediate, independent international access to all SSA-run detention sites and mass grave locations. Linking sanctions specifically to obstruction of investigations should increase their precision and political credibility. Foreign governments should exert diplomatic pressure on the arms-exporting countries, such as Russia, Egypt, and Turkey, to comply with the UN arms embargo imposed on Libya in 2011. This pressure should focus on halting the transfer of weapons to the Libyan authorities and armed groups active in the west and east areas of the country.  

OHCHR, UNSMIL, and the UN Special Rapporteurs should expand monitoring efforts by embedding human rights observers alongside forensic teams to ensure transparent documentation of mass grave sites. OHCHR should increase international pressure by publishing detailed reports identifying specific armed groups and state officials involved in abuses, briefing key UN bodies and international partners on investigative findings, and advocating for the adoption of enforceable accountability mechanisms such as ICC arrest warrants and deepening cooperation between states in investigating crimes. UNHRC should provide resources and personnel to UNSMIL and other efforts, including those envisaged by the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls and the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions. ICC member states should comply with their international obligations to cooperate on criminal matters while expanding public reporting on the status of outstanding warrants. ICC should engage with national authorities, including in Libya, to enhance the domestic judiciary capacity to investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes and ensure victims’ representation and fair trial rights guarantees. International diplomatic pressure from ICC member states, EU governments, the US, and UNSC permanent members should focus on securing GNU's cooperation with the ICC’s evidence collection requests tied to SSA and related paramilitary abuses.

The UN, with support from UNSMIL and key donor states, such as the USA, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom (UK), should establish an independent investigative body to oversee human rights violations across GNU, LAAF, and former SSA-controlled territories. This body should operate under UN leadership, with limited advisory and technical participation from vetted Libyan legal experts. Primary investigative authority should remain with international legal and forensic professionals to ensure impartiality and reduce opportunities for interference. International agreements, potentially endorsed by the UNSC or the OHCHR, should mandate this entity to reduce political obstruction from domestic actors, such as the GNU, LAAF, and SSA, who seek to shield themselves from legal accountability and preserve their political control.

IOM, UNHCR, and international NGOs should expand field-based legal aid teams and mobile reporting systems for migrant victims of detention abuses in Libya. They should design these platforms to protect migrant anonymity while generating credible data for use in future prosecutions. Donors should condition migration-control assistance to GNU authorities on the implementation of biometric migrant registration managed under independent international oversight. Minimum detention standards aligned with international norms and regular access to detention sites for independent international monitors should integrate these procedures to ensure accountability and prevent misuse of sensitive data. This access should enable stronger documentation for future accountability efforts while improving protections for vulnerable groups.

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[1] Libya by Google Maps (This image pixelation has been enhanced by a third-party.)

[2] Libya: Sites of gross human rights violations must be sealed and impartially investigated - Türk, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, June 2025,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/libya-sites-gross-human-rights-violations-must-be-sealed-and-impartially

[3] Ibid

[4] ‘Our worst held fears are being confirmed’: Dozens of bodies discovered in Libya mass graves, UN News, June 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164021

[5] Libya: Government of National Unity must ensure militia leaders are held to account after outbreak of violence in Tripoli, Amnesty International, May 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/libya-government-of-national-unity-must-ensure-militia-leaders-are-held-to-account-after-outbreak-of-violence-in-tripoli/

[6] Injustice By Design: Need for Comprehensive Justice Reform in Libya, Human Rights Watch, June 2025, https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/02/injustice-design/need-comprehensive-justice-reform-libya

[7] 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya, US Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/libya/ 

[8] Libya: Government of National Unity must ensure militia leaders are held to account after outbreak of violence in Tripoli, Amnesty International, May 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/libya-government-of-national-unity-must-ensure-militia-leaders-are-held-to-account-after-outbreak-of-violence-in-tripoli/ 

[9] 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya, US Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/libya/ 

[10] Libya: Government of National Unity must ensure militia leaders are held to account after outbreak of violence in Tripoli, Amnesty International, May 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/libya-government-of-national-unity-must-ensure-militia-leaders-are-held-to-account-after-outbreak-of-violence-in-tripoli/ 

[11] Libya: Civilians Caught in Militia Clashes, Human Rights Watch, May 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/20/libya-civilians-caught-militia-clashes

[12] “Peace and stability in Libya go hand in hand with human rights,” says High Commissioner, OHCHR, July 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/07/peace-and-stability-libya-go-hand-hand-human-rights-says-high

[13] ‘Our worst held fears are being confirmed’: Dozens of bodies discovered in Libya mass graves, UN, June 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164021

[14] Injustice By Design: Need for Comprehensive Justice Reform in Libya, Human Rights Watch, June 2025, https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/02/injustice-design/need-comprehensive-justice-reform-libya 

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid

[17] The killing of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli may be a turning point for Libya, Atlantic Council, May 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-killing-of-abdul-ghani-al-kikli-may-be-a-turning-point-for-libya/ 

[18] Libya: Government of National Unity must ensure militia leaders are held to account after outbreak of violence in Tripoli, Amnesty International, May 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/libya-government-of-national-unity-must-ensure-militia-leaders-are-held-to-account-after-outbreak-of-violence-in-tripoli/

[19] ‘Our worst held fears are being confirmed’: Dozens of bodies discovered in Libya mass graves, UN News, June 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164021

[20] Ibid

[21] Libya: Government of National Unity must ensure militia leaders are held to account after outbreak of violence in Tripoli, Amnesty International, May 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/libya-government-of-national-unity-must-ensure-militia-leaders-are-held-to-account-after-outbreak-of-violence-in-tripoli/

[22] The killing of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli may be a turning point for Libya, Atlantic Council, May 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-killing-of-abdul-ghani-al-kikli-may-be-a-turning-point-for-libya/

[23] “Peace and stability in Libya go hand in hand with human rights,” says High Commissioner, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, July 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/07/peace-and-stability-libya-go-hand-hand-human-rights-says-high

[24] Libya: Sites of gross human rights violations must be sealed and impartially investigated - Türk, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, June 2025,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/libya-sites-gross-human-rights-violations-must-be-sealed-and-impartially

[25] ‘Our worst held fears are being confirmed’: Dozens of bodies discovered in Libya mass graves, UN News, June 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164021

[26] Ibid

[27] Libya: Government of National Unity must ensure militia leaders are held to account after outbreak of violence in Tripoli, Amnesty International, May 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/libya-government-of-national-unity-must-ensure-militia-leaders-are-held-to-account-after-outbreak-of-violence-in-tripoli/

[28] 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya, US Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/libya/

[29] Ibid

[30] Libya: Sites of gross human rights violations must be sealed and impartially investigated - Türk, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, June 2025,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/libya-sites-gross-human-rights-violations-must-be-sealed-and-impartially

[31] ‘Our worst held fears are being confirmed’: Dozens of bodies discovered in Libya mass graves, UN News, June 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164021

[32] Libya: Sites of gross human rights violations must be sealed and impartially investigated - Türk, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, June 2025,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/libya-sites-gross-human-rights-violations-must-be-sealed-and-impartially

[33] 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya, US Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/libya/

[34] Libya: Government of National Unity must ensure militia leaders are held to account after outbreak of violence in Tripoli, Amnesty International, May 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/libya-government-of-national-unity-must-ensure-militia-leaders-are-held-to-account-after-outbreak-of-violence-in-tripoli/

[35] 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya, US Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/libya/

[36] Libya — Migrant Report 55 (November - December 2024), International Organization for Migration , February 2025, https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-migrant-report-55-november-december-2024 

[37] “Peace and stability in Libya go hand in hand with human rights,” says High Commissioner, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, July 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/07/peace-and-stability-libya-go-hand-hand-human-rights-says-high

[38] 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya, US Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/libya/

[39] Visit to Libya: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, its causes and consequences, Reem Alsalem, UN Human Rights Council , May 2023, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/53/36/Add.2 

[40] Libya: Government of National Unity must ensure militia leaders are held to account after outbreak of violence in Tripoli, Amnesty International, May 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/libya-government-of-national-unity-must-ensure-militia-leaders-are-held-to-account-after-outbreak-of-violence-in-tripoli/

[41] ‘Our worst held fears are being confirmed’: Dozens of bodies discovered in Libya mass graves, UN News, June 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164021\

[42] Libya: Sites of gross human rights violations must be sealed and impartially investigated - Türk, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, June 2025,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/libya-sites-gross-human-rights-violations-must-be-sealed-and-impartially

[43] Ibid

[44] Libya: Government of National Unity must ensure militia leaders are held to account after outbreak of violence in Tripoli, Amnesty International, May 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/libya-government-of-national-unity-must-ensure-militia-leaders-are-held-to-account-after-outbreak-of-violence-in-tripoli/

[45] “Peace and stability in Libya go hand in hand with human rights,” says High Commissioner, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, July 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/07/peace-and-stability-libya-go-hand-hand-human-rights-says-high

[46] Ibid

[47] Libya: Civilians Caught in Militia Clashes, Human Rights Watch, May 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/20/libya-civilians-caught-militia-clashes

[48] “Peace and stability in Libya go hand in hand with human rights,” says High Commissioner, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner July 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/07/peace-and-stability-libya-go-hand-hand-human-rights-says-high

[49] Libya 2024, Amnesty International, 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/north-africa/libya/report-libya/

[50] Situation in Libya, International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/libya   

[51] UN report documents mass violations of Libya arms embargo, AP, March 2021, https://apnews.com/international-news-general-news-d7418ac4d2bf98ecf4bc2654c5008e65# 

[52] Situation in Libya, International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/libya 

[53] Ibid

[54] ICC seeks answers after Italy frees Libyan war crimes suspect, Reuters, January 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/senior-libyan-policeman-given-heros-welcome-after-surprise-italy-release-2025-01-22/

[55] Ibid