THREAT CLIMATE ASSESSMENT: US DIPLOMACY TOWARD MYANMAR IS EXPANDING FROM LIMITED ENGAGEMENT TO INCREASED DIRECT OUTREACH
Gayatri PVS, Gabrielle Nerstheimer, Yuyutsa Chavda, Lucy Gibson, PACOM
Jaydn Burgin, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor
November 1, 2026
Diplomatic Meeting[1]
BLUF
US diplomatic engagement with Myanmar is escalating from limited contact to more frequent direct diplomatic outreach.[2] The military coup in 2021 prompted tension, limited diplomatic engagement, and targeted sanctions between the US and Myanmar.[3] US diplomatic engagement will very likely continue escalating through more frequent high-level diplomatic talks with representatives from both countries. Renewed diplomacy will likely allow both countries to pursue shared interests, likely continuing discussions on scam centres and issues that might affect US citizens. These continued talks, expanding from scam centres to rare earth mineral opportunities, will likely increase the chances of US agreements to access key minerals. Ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) territorial control will likely complicate long-term US efforts to secure access to Myanmar’s rare-earth minerals despite continued diplomatic discussions. Increased engagement between both countries will likely reduce Myanmar’s diplomatic isolation from the US, with the potential access to critical minerals likely prompting continued US engagement.
Introduction
Following Myanmar's 2021 military coup, Washington reduced diplomatic contact with the country’s military-backed authorities and imposed sanctions in response to the military’s undermining of democratic institutions.[4] The Biden administration sanctioned military-linked figures and their relatives in February 2021,[5] downgraded ties by declining to send a new ambassador in 2022,[6] and expanded the sanctions list in 2024.[7] Until 2026, one of the US’s main concerns with Myanmar was its scam centers, located in Myanmar and across Southeast Asia, that target American citizens to steal billions of dollars annually.[8] In September 2026, US officials visited Myanmar’s capital, Naypyitaw, to seek the release of detained American businessman Adam Castillo and press for action against scam centers, making it the highest-level meeting between the US and Myanmar since the 2021 coup.[9] On October 9, 2026, the US lifted sanctions on the daughter of military-linked businessman Thein Win Zaw, while maintaining restrictions on him and other sanctioned individuals.[10] A subsequent round of talks took place in Tokyo in October 2026, and the discussions included potential US access to Myanmar's heavy rare-earth minerals.[11] Myanmar has important deposits of the minerals dysprosium and terbium concentrated in Kachin State,[12] and China remains a major buyer of these minerals.[13] EAOs control many of the mineral-rich areas within Kachin State, complicating access to mining sites.[14]
Analysis
Political
Diplomatic engagement between the US and Myanmar will very likely expand from limited relations to more frequent bilateral face-to-face meetings between high-level officials. The Biden administration restricted diplomatic contact with Myanmar following the 2021 military coup and refused to recognize Myanmar’s new regime after accusing it of undermining Myanmar's democratic institutions. The US government downgraded diplomatic relations with Myanmar by declining to replace its departing ambassador in 2022. The US government's increase in diplomatic contacts with the military-backed Myanmar regime will likely lead to a ramping up of discussions over economic topics between the two countries. The increased dialogue will likely lead to increased diplomatic engagement, likely allowing direct dialogue and coordinated action between the current US administration and Myanmar’s government. Renewed US-Myanmar relations will likely enable the two countries to establish transactional agreements that prioritize mutual benefits, with the US prioritizing this pragmatic engagement that will likely promote diplomatic reintegration of Myanmar. Increased diplomatic contact will very likely enable US officials to approach Myanmar's junta more directly, likely allowing the US to voice concerns and seek collaboration with Myanmar decision-makers on issues affecting US citizens. Myanmar’s junta will very likely benefit from increasing talks with the US by gaining direct access to Washington as one of its diplomatic partners.
US sanctions policy toward the Myanmar junta will likely shift from the imposition of targeted sanctions to allowing selective sanctions relief for certain individuals. In February 2021, President Biden imposed sanctions on individuals associated with the Myanmar coup d'état. The sanctions targeted military-linked figures along with their relatives, with a second wave of sanctions in 2024 that expanded the list of sanctioned individuals. The lifting of sanctions by the US will likely become one of the tools to advance its priorities in Myanmar, with the US likely considering options to lift sanctions on certain individuals associated with the military and the junta in the coming months. The removal of sanctions will likely remain selective, with the US maintaining sanctions on key individuals and those tied to human rights abuses. The US administration’s decision to relieve sanctions on one individual will likely give the US an ad hoc bargaining instrument during future diplomatic talks with Myanmar. Relief for some sanctioned individuals will likely indicate that the US is engaging the Myanmar authorities selectively, not dropping the pressure entirely. Myanmar‘s military-backed authorities will likely see the new US opening towards sanctions relief as an opportunity to reduce their isolation from the US, likely improving the international relations of Myanmar’s new administration.
Economic
Diplomatic discussions between the US and Myanmar will very likely evolve from primarily addressing scam centers to placing greater emphasis on rare-earth mineral access. In past years, US engagement with Myanmar focused on shutting down scam centers targeting US citizens that cause billions of dollars in financial losses annually. The expansion of diplomatic talks to negotiate the possibility of US access to Myanmar minerals will very likely allow the US to explore the feasibility of rare-earth mineral extraction in Myanmar. EAOs will likely complicate negotiations and concessions to obtain access to mining sites. The added topic of rare-earth minerals will likely lead the US to increasingly value Myanmar's natural resources, with the US having a roughly even chance of attempting to secure rights to certain mining sites. Access to rare-earth mining in Myanmar would likely provide the US with another possible alternative to relying on Chinese rare-earth minerals. China will likely attempt to maintain a favorable negotiating position with Myanmar, likely aiming to maintain access to mining locations in Myanmar. US-China competition will likely create incentives for the US to continue dialogue with all parties involved in the mining operations, likely including EAOs that control mineral-rich areas. EAOs will likely continue to limit access to minerals in contested areas, likely prompting the US to negotiate economic concessions with Myanmar’s government and the armed groups at the same time.
Threat Climate Assessment
Analysis indicates a HIGH PROBABILITY that the threat climate shifts from limited US diplomatic engagement with Myanmar to increased direct diplomatic outreach, resulting in a diplomatic reconnection and selective collaboration on issues with overlapping benefits. The US will VERY LIKELY modify its approach towards Myanmar, moving away from diplomatic shunning to a more pragmatic and transactional approach that addresses shared security and economic interests. Myanmar and the US will VERY LIKELY continue discussions regarding potential US access to Myanmar’s mineral resources, with territorial control by ethnic armed organisations EAOs LIKELY complicating bilateral negotiations. US access to Myanmar’s mineral resources will LIKELY depend on maintaining contact with both the junta and the EAOs opposed to it, LIKELY hindering the feasibility of resource provision and limiting Myanmar’s potential as an alternative source. The US will VERY LIKELY continue to use the selective lifting of sanctions, previously imposed on Myanmar individuals, as a customizable bargaining chip, keeping broader restrictions in place. The US will VERY LIKELY use direct diplomatic channels with Myanmar, LIKELY enabling the US to protect American citizens and their interests, negotiate cooperation, and maintain dialogue with the junta. The US government's diplomatic interactions with the Myanmar junta will LIKELY reduce Myanmar’s isolation from the US, with a ROUGHLY EVEN CHANCE that the military junta will use this to gain legitimacy and international recognition.
[1] Diplomacy, generated by a third party database
[2] US holds secret talks with Myanmar’s rulers in Tokyo, sources say, Asahi Shimbun, October 2026, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16970449
[3] US slaps sanctions on Myanmar in response to military coup, Reuters, February 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-slaps-sanctions-myanmar-response-military-coup-2021-02-11/
[4] US holds more secret talks with Myanmar's military-backed rulers in Tokyo, sources say, Reuters, October 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-holds-more-secret-talks-with-myanmars-military-backed-rulers-tokyo-sources-2026-10-16/
[5] US slaps sanctions on Myanmar in response to military coup, Reuters, October 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-slaps-sanctions-myanmar-response-military-coup-2021-02-11/
[6] US to downgrade Myanmar ties, decides not to send ambassador, Asia Nikkei, December 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/spotlight/myanmar-crisis/u.s.-to-downgrade-myanmar-ties-decides-not-to-send-ambassador
[7] Imposing Sanctions on Burma’s Military Regime Three Years After the Military Coup, US Embassy in Burma, February 2024, https://mm.usembassy.gov/imposing-sanctions-on-burmas-military-regime-three-years-after-the-military-coup/
[8] US sanctions billion-dollar cyber scam networks in Myanmar and Cambodia, Reuters, September 2025, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/society-equity/us-sanctions-billion-dollar-cyber-scam-networks-myanmar-cambodia-2025-09-09/
[9] US officials made rare visit to Myanmar to free American businessman, Reuters, September 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-officials-made-rare-visit-myanmar-free-american-businessman-2026-09-17/
[10] US lifts sanctions on daughter of Myanmar military-linked businessman, Reuters, October 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-lifts-sanctions-daughter-myanmar-military-linked-businessman-2026-10-09/
[11] US holds more secret talks with Myanmar's military-backed rulers in Tokyo, sources say, Reuters, October 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-holds-more-secret-talks-with-myanmars-military-backed-rulers-tokyo-sources-2026-10-16/
[12] How a war-torn Myanmar plays a critical role in China’s rare earth dominance, NBC News, June 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/war-torn-myanmar-plays-critical-role-chinas-rare-earth-dominance-rcna214685
[13] US Has Opened Direct Talks With Myanmar Government, Report Claims, The Diplomat, October 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/10/us-has-opened-direct-talks-with-myanmar-government-report-claims/
[14] How a war-torn Myanmar plays a critical role in China’s rare earth dominance, NBC News, June 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/war-torn-myanmar-plays-critical-role-chinas-rare-earth-dominance-rcna214685
