CARLOS PATINO FRONT KIDNAPS COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES, SEVERE FLOODING IN ARGENTINA'S PORT CITY CLAIMS 13 LIVES, AND US STUDENT PROTEST OVER KHALIL’S DETENTION ENDS IN ARREST

March 6-12, 2025 | Issue 8 - SOUTHCOM

Kseniya Luzkho, Benedetta Magnante Fralleone, Jacob Robison, Lydia Baccino, Tate English, Julia Eder, Ashley Snyder, Noah Kuttymartin, Katya Burklin, Daniela De Luca, John Impallomeni, Tanner O’Donnell

Samantha Mikulskis, Editor; Clémence Van Damme, Senior Editor

In an effort to bring you the most actionable analytical information, we are combining regions in order to focus our efforts on a multitude of projects. The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) will continue to meet the challenges of the current threat environment as worldwide geopolitical shifts demand that we stay agile and flexible.

El Plateado and La Hacienda, Colombia[1]

Date: March 7, 2025

Location: Cauca Province, Colombia

Parties involved: Colombia; Colombian government; Colombian security forces; kidnapped Colombian security forces; Colombian law enforcement; Colombian emergency responders; left-wing FARC dissident group, the Carlos Patino Front; Colombian civilians; Colombian dissident armed groups; Colombian communities affected by armed groups

The event: Amid ongoing state counter-insurgency operations targeting armed groups in El Plateado and La Hacienda, the Carlos Patino Front kidnapped 29 Colombian security force officers.[2]

Analysis & Implications:

The state’s inability to prevent kidnappings and maintain control of the region will very likely increase civilian distrust in government protection, likely fueling ongoing uprisings against security forces. These uprisings will likely transform into coordinated resistance movements as communities mobilize against perceived system governmental abandonment and security negligence. The Carlos Patino Front will likely capitalize on this regional instability by strengthening extortion networks and alternative justice mechanisms that directly challenge state legitimacy. This dynamic will likely further push civilians toward illicit yet stable sources of income and security, like coca farming and armed group protection, likely perpetuating a generational cycle of governmental distrust and dependence on illegal activities.
By targeting two locations simultaneously, the Carlos Patino Front likely aims to divide and strain Colombia's security forces and emergency services, likely undermining security in both communities. This group likely exploits the need for emergency responders to simultaneously handle multiple critical tasks, such as medical aid and rescue operations, likely forcing a response that stretches resources thin and hampers their effectiveness. This personnel split and resource strain will very likely delay emergency response times and make security forces more vulnerable to follow-up attacks or additional officers’ kidnapping, very likely reducing their operational effectiveness. Law enforcement's reduced effectiveness very likely compromises community safety, as the Carlos Patino Front’s anticipation of security force locations and response patterns very likely leaves civilians unprotected.

Date: March 8, 2025

Location: Bahia Blanca, Buenos Aires Province, Argentina

Parties involved: Argentinian government; Buenos Aires provincial authorities; businesses and workers in Bahia Blanca; Argentinian criminal clan, Los Monos; organized crime groups (OCGs) in Argentina; civilians in Bahia Blanca

The event: Severe flooding in the port city caused 13 fatalities, multiple injuries, and significant infrastructure damage.[3]

Analysis & Implications:

Businesses located in the area will likely have difficulties recovering from the floods due to productivity losses and physical damage to infrastructure, likely affecting the economic security of their workers. As companies struggle to regain financial footing, they will likely reduce employees’ work hours and implement layoffs amid decreased revenue and mounting recovery expenses, likely threatening workers' income security. With lower disposable income, workers will likely prioritize essential expenses such as medical care and food, likely neglecting protective measures like home reinforcements and insurance coverage that would reduce their vulnerability to future disasters. To meet their basic needs, these workers will likely resort to loans, entering a cycle of debt that diminishes their ability to build emergency savings, likely increasing their financial vulnerability to natural hazards including volcanic activities, heat waves, and coastal flooding.
OCGs active in the area, such as Los Monos, will very likely exploit the chaos caused by the floods, likely engaging in extortion and recruitment while provincial authorities focus on recovery efforts. Argentinian OCGs will likely exploit the flooding, likely leveraging civilians' desperation by offering quick relief, such as money, food, and protection in exchange for cooperation and loyalty with illicit operations like drug trafficking. Delays or mismanagement of recovery efforts, including repairing bridges and restoring power systems, will likely cause civilian distress, likely enabling OCGs to exploit the disaster by reinforcing perceptions of insufficient government aid, likely driving some civilians to seek their support. If civilians maintain this perception, eroded trust in provincial authorities combined with OCGs' ability to provide relief services will likely strengthen their recognition in Bahia Blanca as a more socially legitimate and operationally efficient group.

Date: March 11, 2025

Location: New York City, New York State, USA

Parties involved: US President Donald Trump; Trump administration; US federal government; US federal agencies; US Department of Homeland Security (DHS); US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); immigration restrictionists in the US; Trump’s supporters; US educational institution, Columbia University; Columbia University student and pro-Palestinian activists, Mahmoud Khalil; Khalil’s supporters; Columbia students; pro-Palestinian supporters; protesters; US universities; militant Palestinian nationalist movement, Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)

The event: A student protest in Washington Square for Khalil’s detention led to 11 citations and one arrest for disorderly conduct and obstruction to government administration.[4]

Analysis & Implications:

The charges placed on the protesters advocating for Khalil's release will likely strengthen the views of immigration restrictionists, including Trump supporters, on related policies. These legal actions against demonstrators will likely reinforce existing perspectives that favor enhanced deportation procedures and stricter border controls among individuals who already support such measures. Public discussions following these protests will likely reinforce immigration restrictionists' belief that authorities should take a tougher stance on pro-Palestinian supporters, viewing them as potential security threats, including inciting violence or supporting Hamas. Anti-immigration supporters will likely view the official response to these demonstrations as a validation of their position that immigration enforcement requires more assertive approaches to protect national interests.
Federal agencies, such as ICE and DHS, will likely use the high-profile protests at Columbia University to push for greater control over campus activism across the country, very likely framing intervention as necessary for national security. Establishing this precedent will likely lead to increased surveillance and student arrests, likely compelling universities to adopt stricter demonstration policies and limit freedom of expression on campus, even in the absence of disruptive gatherings. This strategic approach will likely affect universities with fewer financial resources first, as they are almost certainly more vulnerable to the threat of federal funding reductions and have limited capacity to resist external mandates. Given their dependence on governmental financial support, educational institutions will likely begin integrating federal security priorities into their policies, turning into enforcement mechanisms for oversight without the need for direct federal presence.
The government’s continued focus on student advocacy will almost certainly provoke a significant backlash, as they will very likely oppose what they regard as threats to their First Amendment rights. As government crackdowns on student activism intensify, students will interpret these actions as direct assaults on constitutional principles they consider foundational to academic discourse, very likely heightening their sense of moral obligation to defend democratic values through continued presence on campus. Students will very likely escalate their resistance through larger demonstrations, encampments, and civil disobedience, such as blocking traffic, very likely resulting in the risk of violent confrontations. Universities will likely need to prioritize either campus safety or safeguarding freedom of speech, likely impacting the future of student activism and the extent to which students can express dissenting opinions.

[1] Cauca Department, Colombia by Google Maps, created by CTG members

[2] Colombia says 29 security force members kidnapped in Cauca province, Reuters, March 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-says-29-security-force-members-kidnapped-cauca-province-2025-03-07/

[3] Deadly floods engulf Argentine city after fierce storm, BBC, March 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g07dqep0ko

[4] Protest to support Columbia University activist Mahmoud Khalil leads to arrests at New York City Hall, CBS, March 2025, https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/mahmoud-khalil-protest-arrests-at-city-hall/#