INCREASED RISK OF ASYMMETRIC RETALIATION AGAINST THE US AND ITS ALLIES ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST AND BEYOND FOLLOWING ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC) TARGETING DIRECTIVES
Basma Aamri, Rebecca Davis, Hermione Goux, Cora Jordan, Gehad Ahmed, Sophie Rieckmann, AFRICOM, WATCH/GSOC Team
Chloe Pentz, Olivia Turnbull, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor
November 3, 2026
Flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran[1]
The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) is issuing a FLASH ALERT to US and UK forces and citizens across the Middle East following reports that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is actively identifying new targets for potential conflict with the US and Israel.[2] Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, ordered armed forces to maintain maximum combat readiness and update Iran’s target database to encompass US and Israeli physical and non-physical assets.[3] On November 1, Iran’s Foreign Ministry designated the British Royal Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF) as terrorist organizations and classified MI6 as a hostile entity, placing British assets at risk.[4] US President Donald Trump has continually publicly raised the possibility of renewed military action against Iran, while US Central Command (CENTCOM) leadership reportedly presented him with potential strike options.[5] Despite diplomatic outreach involving US Vice President JD Vance and regional intermediaries ahead of the November 3 midterms elections deadline, Tehran continues to signal its readiness for further confrontation. Khamenei warned that any renewed US or Israeli military action would prompt an immediate Iranian response, declaring that it would be “without geographic limits.” [6]
CTG is on HIGH alert for prolonged security disruptions affecting the US and its allies, and wider Western interests, as Khamenei’s warning of an immediate response without geographical limitations VERY LIKELY indicates Iran’s retaliatory posture is no longer confined to established regional targets. US, UK, and allies’ military personnel, diplomatic missions, and defense infrastructure, and Western citizens will LIKELY face increased threat exposure, including at locations outside of traditional conflict zones. Iranian-aligned groups, including militias in Iraq and Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, will VERY LIKELY increase mobilization and hostile activity against US, UK, Israeli, and Western interests, with a ROUGHLY EVEN CHANCE of coordinated or sustained attacks across multiple regional theatres. Iran and affiliated actors will VERY LIKELY seek to extend the threat beyond conventional military targets through asymmetric activity such as cyber operations, attempted sabotage, disruption of critical infrastructure, and intelligence gathering.
Introduction
On October 31, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei issued a directive to senior military commanders instructing the Iranian Armed Forces to deliver a military response “without geographical limitations” to any threat identified as an enemy, according to the state news agency Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA).[7] On November 1, IRGC spokesperson Brigadier General Hossein Mohebi publicly reiterated the directive, stating that the organisation had begun identifying additional targets for attacks and planning operations across previously uninvolved geographical areas.[8]
US President Donald Trump publicly raised the possibility of renewed military action against Iran on October 23, stating at a rally in Florida that Washington “may do another little Epic Fury.”[9] Operation Epic Fury was the US military campaign against Iran launched on February 28, 2026, alongside Israeli military operations.[10] Earlier this month, CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper had reportedly already briefed Trump at the White House on potential military strike options against Iran.[11]
Iranian officials have maintained that ending the conflict remains conditional on requirements outlined in September, including an end to hostilities across all fronts, the release of frozen Iranian assets and the lifting of the US naval blockade.[12] On October 28, reports emerged that US Vice President JD Vance had sent a letter to Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary, Mohsen Rezaei, exploring the possibility of restarting negotiations.[13] The correspondence reportedly addressed the potential framework for renewed diplomatic engagement, including fragile discussions over Iran's nuclear programme.[14] Trump subsequently characterised the communication as relating to medical supplies for Iran.[15]
On November 1, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it had classified MI6 as a hostile entity, and the RAF and British Royal Navy as terrorist organizations under Iranian law.[16] The ministry mentioned that it had done so to protect Iran’s national security, and as a consequence of the UK’s involvement in the US-Iran conflict.[17]
The Strait of Hormuz remains a central point of contention, with Iranian forces continuing to use maritime access as strategic leverage against Washington.[18] Iranian forces have maintained threats and attacks against commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman, linking the restoration of unrestricted maritime passage to the lifting of the blockade and wider negotiations.[19] On November 2, IRGC reported that two crude oil tankers had caught fire after striking mines in the Strait of Hormuz, amid continuing reports of attacks against commercial shipping.[20]
Analysis
Threat to US and UK Operating Bases and Western Civilian Personnel
IRGC and aligned regional proxy networks will very likely conduct coordinated asymmetric strikes against the US and UK forward operating bases and diplomatic compounds across the Middle East, should Washington authorize renewed kinetic strikes. Iranian armed forces will very likely deploy one-way attack drones, short-range ballistic missiles, and barrages to bypass base perimeter defenses at installations in Iraq, northeastern Iraq, and the broader Gulf rim. These attacks will very likely focus on perimeter security command centers hosting Western joint task forces. Iranian intelligence units and proxy networks have a roughly even chance of targeting Western diplomatic missions and consular outposts to force emergency evacuations, creating political volatility by straining host-nation ties and pressuring Western capitals into crisis responses. There is a roughly even chance that Iranian ballistic missiles will attack Western bases outside the Middle East, such as RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, provoking decisive military action from countries such as the UK, expanding the conflict. Deployed personnel and base security will very likely face operational strain from intermittent indirect fire (IDF) and active counter-unmanned aerial (C-UAS) engagements. Iran-aligned forces will likely target tactical perimeter access routes and supply convoys with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) to sever ground lines of communication between coalition facilities.
Western defense contractors, international enterprise personnel, and expatriate US and UK citizens operating throughout the Gulf and Levant will almost certainly face elevated physical danger and severe transit disruptions. IRGC-aligned covert operatives and localized militia factions will likely surveil transit routes, with a roughly even chance of setting up fraudulent checkpoints to abduct Western defense contractors, energy executives, and dual nationals during routine commutes for political leverage. Iranian and proxy electronic warfare units will likely deploy GPS spoofing to degrade precision-guided munition guidance and divert uncrewed aerial systems, simultaneously corrupting civilian navigation and forcing regional airspace closures. Critical infrastructure service providers and municipal facilities supporting Western expat populations will likely experience secondary operational disruptions from falling intercept debris and cross-border missile vectors. Iran-aligned intelligence services, such as Chinese and Russian state-linked groups, will almost certainly escalate digital reconnaissance and geo-tracking campaigns against US and UK nationals to identify high-value targets for asymmetric leverage. Heightened alert postures and localized shelter-in-place directives across the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait will very likely cause immediate commercial bottlenecks, severe logistics paralysis, and evacuation challenges across urban centers hosting significant Western populations.
Attacks on Internet Cables, Data Centers and Financial Assets
The IRGC will likely attack undersea cables beneath and around the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to disrupt telecommunication services and internet traffic in Gulf countries such as UAE, Qatar, and Oman. State-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups will very likely launch cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure in the Middle East and Western countries, including energy and banking sectors, government ministries, and commercial and technology companies such as Google, Microsoft, and Apple. Daily services, social media, and commercial activities that rely on the internet will likely face high latency, slow speeds, or partial blackouts. E-commerce services will very likely see a significant drop in revenue and profits, costing millions of dollars due to disruption of daily communication, remote work, and supply chain channels that connect regional hubs with international corporations. This will very likely pressure, in the short term, thousands of citizens and expats, who make up more than half the population in the UAE and Qatar and rely on remittances, by reducing job opportunities and salary transactions due to the operational slowdown for multinational companies. Disruption in communication will very likely affect daily connectivity and international calls, increasing anxiety and worries among civilians in these countries. AI centers and cloud services in countries such as the UAE will likely face disruptions as they rely on heavy data traffic, making real-time data transfers inaccurate or impossible. International companies such as Microsoft, which have regional hubs in Gulf countries, will likely experience network congestion, search for alternative land-based cables that cause delays in the flow of data, and incur financial losses for these companies.
Maritime Risk
Should US/Israeli-Iranian hostilities resume, maritime attacks will likely become one of the most persistent threats to US, UK, and Israeli personnel and vessels operating around the Gulf waters over the following weeks. Iran will very likely favor the sea as an attack ground because it allows using covert, low-cost methods, such as limpet mine attacks, likely challenging attack attribution and response by leveraging its anti-ship ballistic missiles and fast ships that attack rapidly. The IRGC Navy will very likely rely on small boats and spotters to track ships near ports, anchorages, and the Gulf of Oman, where escorts and overwatch will likely struggle to cover every vessel. Maritime vessels crossing the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, and Strait of Hormuz will very likely experience coordinated and unexpected drone attacks, vessel sinking, and structure damage, disrupting international supply chains. Crew members will very likely experience trauma of being trapped at sea for an extended period of time, and face the risk of direct fire and drone attacks. US, UK, and Israeli naval personnel, merchant seafarers, port staff, and civilians will very likely face higher risk and disruption, with repeated incidents likely stretching efforts and surveillance across increased ships and waters, leaving gaps for attackers to exploit.
Iranian Proxy Network
Iran-aligned groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis will likely strike within the same operational timeframe, operating independently without a unified command structure or tactical coordination to pursue separate political objectives. Iran will very likely take advantage of Hezbollah’s active aim to upgrade and amplify military capabilities to conduct strikes against Israel, which is unlikely to happen in the short to medium term. Should Hezbollah enter the scenario, the group will very likely constrain its command-and-control capabilities to balance its resources, such as warfare and manpower, likely to protect its small units and reduce exposure. The Houthis position will very likely serve as Iranian leverage to pressure regional US allies such as Saudi Arabia to meet the group’s demands in Yemen, as the group likely sustains its Red Sea campaign to block sea trade globally, with a focus on attacking US, UK, and Israeli vessels. This campaign will very likely aim at Saudi’s strategic civilian infrastructure such as airports or desalination plants to frighten local and international populations. The Houthis will very likely become more solidly involved from the outset than Hezbollah, prompted by a perceived psychological superiority in withstanding the conflict and the inability of the Saudis to curtail Houthi action amid prolonged conflict.
Iranian Nuclear Non-Proliferation Disengagement
Should the US or Israel resume kinetic action, Iran will likely curtail remaining International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cooperation to its nuclear sites while stopping short of leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran will very likely continue to present itself as a compliant NPT member to retain diplomatic support from Russia, China, Pakistan, and Gulf mediators. Iran will very likely simultaneously continue its criticism of the IAEA and US and Israeli kinetic attacks to justify delaying nuclear site inspections. Further strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites will very likely cause parts of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile to be buried or dispersed under rubble, likely making it more difficult for Iran to secure its stockpile safely and ensure that no material is lost, stolen, or falls into the hands of IRGC members outside of the official chain of command. Without IAEA inspectors on site, the US and UK will very likely be unable to detect whether Iran is degrading or upgrading its uranium enrichment, as satellite imagery cannot penetrate the underground nuclear facilities. US, EU, and Israeli intelligence will likely rely more on covert action without IAEA inspectors, such as sabotage and the targeting of Iranian nuclear scientists, likely prompting Iranian counter-intelligence actions in Iran and retaliatory plots on Western and Israeli targets abroad. Uncertainty over Iran’s nuclear program will likely act as a deterrent and strengthen Tehran’s negotiation leverage, even without a nuclear weapon. US and UK military forces will likely be confronted with the possibility of a nuclear-capable adversary, limiting military options against Iran and requiring greater investment in missile defence protection for forces and civilians in the region. In the event of Iran shifting to complete nuclear opacity, UK and US civilians across the Gulf will very likely face a heightened threat environment.
Recommendations
The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) recommends deploying advanced air defense systems and real-time monitoring in collaboration with Gulf countries such as the UAE and Qatar to identify and intercept missiles or aerial objects to secure critical infrastructure and data centers in the region.
Naval patrols of the US and UK around the Strait of Hormuz should prioritize using Maritime Domain Surveillance combined with vetted AI detection and real-time data tools that easily detect suspicious maritime activities.
Diplomatic missions, consular outposts, and private Western security firms in high-threat regional sectors should review and update non-combatant emergency evacuation plans (NEO), establish hardened secondary communication channels, and stockpile emergency medical supplies ahead of potential border or airspace closures.
Western corporate enterprises, defense contractors, and civilian expatriates operating in the Gulf should limit non-essential travel near military installations or coastal maritime corridors, maintain strict operational security (OPSEC), disable public device geolocation services, and register with state crisis management programs such as the US Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) travel advisory network.
US, UK, and allied intelligence organizations should reprioritize surveillance and collection of known and suspected Iranian nuclear sites, particularly Isfahan’s tunnel complex, to track the location and movement of highly enriched uranium in the absence of IAEA inspectors.
US and UK commands in Europe should coordinate with security forces to raise force protection at bases potentially used for long-distance strikes on Iran, including RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus and Ramstein Air Base in Germany, and ensure that personnel and their families living off base are equipped with the necessary threat awareness of potential Iranian retaliation abroad.
CTG’s WATCH/GSOC Team assesses that the climate is HIGH for the IRGC to carry out attacks targeting US and UK bases, diplomatic compounds, Western-linked enterprises, and expatriates across the Middle East using methods such as intimidation, hostage-taking, and surveillance to identify Western targets, and leveraging drones and ballistic missiles. Should a US attack occur, Iranian retaliation will likely extend to Western interests and personnel in Europe, including through threats against diplomatic missions, Israeli-linked institutions, and organizations perceived to support US or UK interests. Such activity will very likely involve cyber operations, covert surveillance, and attempted disruption of critical infrastructure to intimidate US-allied forces. Iran will likely initiate retaliatory attacks against physical and non-physical infrastructure across the Middle East and beyond, should the US or Israel attack the country. US and UK military assets, personnel, and financial institutions will likely face heightened risk, particularly those with direct or perceived links to either country. IRGC will likely target undersea cables beneath and around the Strait of Hormuz, threatening a partial block-out of telecommunications and the internet, forcing regional countries such as the UAE to rely more on land-based cables, likely affecting thousands of businesses and critical infrastructure, including regional data hubs and AI centers. Iran will very likely favor the maritime domain for its attacks because it allows for the use of covert, low-cost methods, such as limpet mine attacks, likely challenging attack attribution and response. A kinetic attack on Iran will very likely make critical infrastructure its main target, likely increasing the risk of wider regional and international escalation.
Analysis indicates that there is a HIGH PROBABILITY that, should the US renew strikes, the IRGC will respond with coordinated asymmetric attacks, LIKELY targeting Western security command centers, access routes, and supply convoys in the Middle East to disrupt communications and operationalization. IRGC-aligned covert operatives will LIKELY target US and UK high-value individuals by leveraging surveillance, digital reconnaissance, intimidation, and hostage-taking attempts, VERY LIKELY threatening severe physical and transit dangers around Western residential compounds and diplomatic routes. Iran will VERY LIKELY leverage maritime attacks by using covert, low-cost tactics, such as limpet mine attacks, to weaken the US and UK’s naval presence in the Gulf, LIKELY challenging attack attribution and response. This will VERY LIKELY result in the stretching of US and UK escort and surveillance efforts across the region, LIKELY creating exploitable gaps. Iranian proxies, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, will LIKELY activate as separate units operating with different processes and interests, with Iran VERY LIKELY leveraging each group’s capabilities and location to assert control and block trade, focusing on US, UK, and Israeli vessels. Iran will VERY LIKELY use the resurgence of kinetic action as grounds for delayed nuclear site inspections while claiming to remain a compliant NPT member, LIKELY pushing the US and its allies to turn to covert action, including sabotage, triggering retaliatory plots on Western and Israeli targets abroad.
[1] Iran, generated by a third party database
[2] Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Say They Are Identifying New Targets for Possible US Conflict, Khaama Press, November 2026, https://www.khaama.com/iran-irgc-new-targets-possible-us-conflict/
[3] Iran’s Mojtaba Khamenei warns US, Israel of response ‘without geographic limits’, Indian Express, October 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/iran-mojtaba-khamenei-military-response-geographic-limits-us-israel-10945119/
[4] Iran Designates UK's MI6 as Hostile Group, Royal Navy and RAF as Terrorist Organizations, Government of the Islamic republic of Iran, November 2026, https://irangov.ir/detail/492354
[5] Vance outreach to Iran related to medical supplies, says Trump, Reuters, October 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vance-outreach-iran-related-medical-supplies-says-trump-2026-10-29/
[6] Iran’s Mojtaba Khamenei warns US, Israel of response ‘without geographic limits’, Indian Express, October 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/iran-mojtaba-khamenei-military-response-geographic-limits-us-israel-10945119/
[7] Ibid
[8] Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Say They Are Identifying New Targets for Possible US Conflict, Khaama Press, November 2026, https://www.khaama.com/iran-irgc-new-targets-possible-us-conflict/
[9] Trump says US may do another military operation against Iran, Reuters, October 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-us-may-do-another-military-operation-against-iran-2026-10-23/
[10] Ibid
[11] Vance outreach to Iran related to medical supplies, says Trump, Reuters, October 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vance-outreach-iran-related-medical-supplies-says-trump-2026-10-29/
[12] Will Iran take up Vance lifeline to avoid another US attack?, Al-Monitor, October 2026, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/10/will-iran-take-vance-lifeline-avoid-another-us-attack
[13] Vance outreach to Iran related to medical supplies, says Trump, Reuters, October 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vance-outreach-iran-related-medical-supplies-says-trump-2026-10-29/
[14] Ibid
[15] Vance outreach to Iran related to medical supplies, says Trump, Reuters, October 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vance-outreach-iran-related-medical-supplies-says-trump-2026-10-29/
[16] Iran Designates UK's MI6 as Hostile Group, Royal Navy and RAF as Terrorist Organizations, Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, November 2026, https://irangov.ir/detail/492354
[17] Ibid
[18] Limpet mine attack in Hormuz suggests Iran may be shifting tactics, Al-Monitor, October 2026, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/10/limpet-mine-attack-hormuz-suggests-iran-may-be-shifting-tactics
[19] Ibid
[20] Tanker Hit by Two Unknown Projectiles in Arabian Gulf, UKMTO Says, Khaama Press, November 2026, https://www.khaama.com/tanker-hit-projectiles-near-saudi-arabia/
