LIBYAN AUTHORITIES ANNOUNCED THEY WILL INCREASE THEIR DEPORTATIONS OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS, AFFECTING REGIONAL RELATIONS AND SOLDIERS ATTEMPTED A COUP D'ÉTAT IN BENIN, BUT IT WAS THWARTED
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December 4-10, 2025 | Issue 48 - CENTCOM/AFRICOM Team
Giovanni Lamberti, Amelia Bell, Cora Jordan, Benjamin Baruch, Ludovica Leccese
Elizabeth Fignar, Editor; Jennifer Loy, Chief Editor
Land Migration in Africa[1]
Date: December 4, 2025
Location: Libya
Parties involved: Libya; government; Libyan authorities; European Union (EU); member states; European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM); European Union Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex; Sudan; Sudanese migrants; Algeria; Tunisia; Italy; Greece; migrants; asylees; smugglers; countries
The event: Libyan authorities announced that they will increase the deportations of irregular[2] migrants to their countries of origin.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
These mass deportations will very likely expose Sudanese migrants to human rights violations, likely leading them to escape Sudan via dangerous or illegal routes that reduce asylum security. The threats present in migrants' home countries, such as forced labor, forced recruitment and widespread sexual violence in areas controlled by armed groups, will very likely push them to escape via riskier smuggling routes through desert and conflict zones, likely avoiding registration to limit their traceability. This will very likely make asylees more vulnerable to smugglers exploiting them for human sex trafficking and slavery in transit, very likely increasing disappearances and deaths along irregular migration routes in the Sahel and Maghreb.
The deportation of migrants will likely create tensions between EU-Libya relations, very likely impacting their cooperation framework on migration. In response, the EU will very likely step up aerial and ground surveillance practices through EUBAM or Frontex, likely investing in more sophisticated equipment such as UAV vigilance drones, longer nighttime patrol shifts, and offshore patrol vessels off the southern Mediterranean coast. The Union's main aim with these practices will very likely be to maintain stable institutional relationships and likely portray itself as controlling the outflow of migrants from Libya. Despite the efforts, the EU will very likely receive criticism from member states that have a more pragmatic stance on migration policies, such as Italy or Greece, likely anticipating an increase of cross-border migration to their countries.
Libya’s intensified deportations will very likely push smugglers to shift migration routes towards Tunisia and Algeria to compensate for lost revenue. Smugglers will likely exploit weaker border surveillance and strengthen desert corridors in western Libya, likely enabling them to maintain flow volume, avoiding government pressure such as raids on detention hubs and increased patrols. This route displacement will very likely increase migrant movement into Tunisia’s Sfax corridor and Algeria’s Tamanrasset region, where smugglers will likely rely on dispersed pick up points, night crossings, and militia-linked guides to minimize detection by local authorities. As Tunisia and Algeria absorb the migrant flows, smugglers will very likely expand operations in these areas by increasing convoy frequency and raising prices, very likely creating more resilient trafficking corridors.
Date: December 8, 2025
Location: Benin
Parties involved: Benin; President of Benin Patrice Talon; Beninese government; government forces; Beninese military; military personnel; Beninese military patrols; perceived dissidents; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); member states; ECOWAS Standby Force; Nigerian Armed Forces; al-Qaeda affiliated Islamist militant group Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM); Salafi Jihadist terrorist organization Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP); reconnaissance teams; troops; soldiers
The event: Soldiers in Benin seized the national TV station in a coup attempt that was thwarted by government forces.[4]
Analysis & Implications:
ECOWAS will very likely escalate its diplomatic and military pressure through its member states, likely demanding joint action to restore stability in Benin. The ECOWAS Standby Force will very likely rapidly intensify its military presence in Benin, likely aiming to appear as a credible force countering another regional coup. The recent French support of Nigerian Armed Forces will likely sustain a coordinated effort with the ECOWAS Force, very likely as part of preemptive measures to strengthen security on the shared border and curbing smuggling, illicit trade, or jihadist spread. ECOWAS will very likely prolong its presence longer than originally expected to thwart future coup attempts without assuming direct control of Benin, likely protecting key government buildings and blocking the country’s exit routes.
The Beninese government will likely alter their military force structure to eliminate suspected elements associated with the attempted coup, likely generating exploitable security conditions in northern Benin. The Beninese military will likely discharge and arrest military personnel who are considered disloyal while allocating more responsibility, troops, and assets to loyalists in Cotonou, very likely limiting the available leadership, equipment, and intelligence to northern Benin. The reduction of military asset availability in north Benin will very likely reduce the flow of HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, very likely generating intelligence gaps along the Pendjari–W National Park belt. Increased intelligence gaps will very likely reduce border security along the Pendjari–W Park belt, likely allowing JNIM and ISSP to deploy reconnaissance teams and map Beninese patrol routines along this route and enabling them to stage attacks against Beninese military patrols.
The attempted coup revealed deeper fractures within the military that will very likely drive more internal instability in the coming months. These fractures will likely widen as soldiers continue to view Talon’s handling of the northern insecurity as inadequate, likely increasing resentment toward political leadership. This resentment towards political leadership will very likely intensify as Talon expands punitive measures against perceived dissidents, as these will likely consolidate the belief that the government refuses to address operational grievances. With political pressure in the form of punitive response, and security pressure in the north, disaffected factions will very likely shift toward more coordinated forms of defiance such as refusing deployments and obstructing command decisions, likely undermining state authority even without another immediate coup attempt.
[1] Land Migration in Africa, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)
[2] “Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination” (https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms)
[3] Libya steps up deportations of Sub-Saharan African migrants, Africanews, December 2025, https://www.africanews.com/2025/12/04/libya-steps-up-deportations-of-sub-saharan-african-migrants/
[4] Benin president says coup bid thwarted, vows retribution, Reuters, December 2025,
