PSA NICARAGUA PART 2: THE ORTEGA-MURILLO GOVERNMENT’S CONTINUED REPRESSION OF POLITICAL DISSENT; HOST COUNTRIES SHOULD PROVIDE ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES TO PROTECT EXILED NICARAGUANS
- 22 minutes ago
- 17 min read
Khushi Salian, Lorenzo Calavaro, Rebecca Davis, Hermione Goux, Gehad Ahmed, WATCH/GSOC Team
Lizel Klaasen, Alessandro Portolano, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor
April 2, 2026
Nicaragua[1]
Introduction
Following the report focused on restricted press freedom and repression of journalism in Nicaragua, this report examines the broader mechanisms the government employs to suppress political dissent domestically and abroad. Under the leadership of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, authorities have expanded efforts to target critics across multiple sectors of society, including civil society organizations, religious institutions, and political opposition networks, committing crimes against humanity, violating the rights to life, personal integrity, health, personal liberty, assembly, freedom of expression, and access to justice.[2] The Ortega-Murillo presidency will almost certainly respond to calls for intervention with increased internal control and deepening ties with its non-Western partners. As the military is loyal to the regime and external actors are unlikely to intervene, regime change is very unlikely. With the increase in Nicaragua’s surveillance and control, host countries should increase their digital and physical security measures to protect the exiled Nicaraguan civilians.
Summary
Human rights violations in Nicaragua persist, worsened after the April 2018 protests over social security reforms that promised to increase taxes while reducing benefits. The state responded with arbitrary detentions, torture, and the use of lethal force against protestors, dubbed “Operation Clean-up.” [3] In October 2018, Amnesty International reported several human rights violations committed between May and September.[4] This included the use of military-grade weapons against civilians by pro-government groups and law enforcement, including rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers during this period.[5] In July 2018, a siege at the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua resulted in two deaths and 17 injuries when security forces tried to break down protestors’ barricades.[6] In Jinotega, riot police shot and killed Leyting Chavarría, a 16-year-old armed with a slingshot.[7] In Jinotepe, the colleagues of police officer Faber López, who tried to resign, allegedly tortured and killed him; without providing any evidence, the state claimed he was shot and killed by a “terrorist”’ gunman.[8]
As of 2026, the UN reports that the government finances repression through public funds.[9] Since the 2018 escalation in repression, funding for social initiatives, including the misuse of public assets such as vehicles and social assistance for food, has been reallocated for security operations.[10] Beyond their borders, the state reportedly uses public money to fund large-scale transnational intelligence and surveillance networks to track, threaten, and terrorize Nicaraguans abroad who oppose the regime.[11]
Since February 2023, the government denaturalized 450 Nicaraguan nationals, with many still stateless.[12] Statelessness refers to the government stripping citizens of their rights, thereby revoking access to public services, preventing them from finding employment in Nicaragua, and from obtaining passports.[13] In September 2024, authorities denaturalized and exiled 135 political prisoners to Guatemala, expropriating their property, and sentencing 46 members of the political opposition to prison, including leaders of indigenous communities.[14] Many opposition members now live abroad, especially in Costa Rica, which granted asylum to over 200,000 people and the refugee status to more than 15,000 Nicaraguans between 2018 and 2024.[15] After the murder of four exiled political opponents in Central America, many Nicaraguans fled to the USA and Europe in fear of their government's reach.[16] Human rights groups report highly organized efforts to target victims, employing physical intimidation with serious bodily harm, and assassination attempts.[17] One person reportedly survived two assassination attempts over three years while in exile in Costa Rica, a few days after an anonymous source had harassed and sent him death threats.[18] This pattern of intimidation followed by physical aggression is consistent across both surviving and deceased victims.[19]
In September 2024, the Nicaraguan National Assembly amended its criminal code to prosecute citizens living abroad, accused of committing crimes in Nicaragua, allowing the ruling party to target political opponents in exile.[20] The assembly expanded judicial powers to allow the assembly to seize the accused assets and impose criminal charges in absentia against those encouraging sanctions against the Nicaraguan government, institutions, and its officials.[21] The National Assembly justifies criminalizing these actions by defining them as undermining national integrity, punishable with several years of imprisonment.[22]
According to Nicaragua’s Institute of Statistics and Census’s last recorded report in 2005, Catholics constitute 59 percent of the total population, followed by evangelical Protestants, constituting 22 percent, which also includes Baptists, Mennonites, Moravian Lutherans, and Pentecostals.[23] Since 2023, the government has forcefully exiled or deported over 200 religious members, particularly key Catholic figures.[24] In January 2024, the government targeted Catholic priests, deporting over 19 clergy members to the Vatican, including government critic Bishop Rolando Álvarez.[25] The government has escalated this oppression by issuing death threats and revoking broadcasting licenses of the Catholic Church, including 10 radio stations and three television stations.[26] The Ortega-Murillo regime represses religious identity and expression by withholding the passports of Nicaraguan priests, clergymen, and nuns, and disrupting institutional continuity through arbitrary investigations[27] Since August 2023, this repression has spread to the evangelical and protestant religious groups, with the authorities expelling 11 imprisoned evangelical pastors.[28]
The Nicaraguan government has routinely requested the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to issue red notices against regime opponents, and used anonymous social media profiles to create false allegations against citizens in exile, such as money-laundering and terrorism-financing.[29] The Nicaraguan government falsely reported that nationals’ passports had been revoked or stolen from the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database, which constitutes an abuse of INTERPOL’s law enforcement cooperation tools.[30] As a result, INTERPOL restricted the movement of Nicaraguans, exposing them to interrogation at the borders or airports, and forcing them to use a different country's passport, residence permits, or alternative identity documentation.[31]
In 2025, the UN formally identified 54 individuals from the Nicaraguan government for crimes against humanity.[32] They described a “coordinated system of repression,” an accusation which resulted in Nicaragua’s withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council.[33] The Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHREN) continues to investigate Nicaragua and document ongoing human rights abuses, collecting evidence and identifying perpetrators.[34] In 2026, the group put out another call for intervention, stressing the severity of the situation.[35] Human Rights Watch and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) have been monitoring Nicaragua closely, gathering testimonies and publishing reports on violations based on eyewitness statements from expelled victims and NGOs.[36] Both organizations have openly condemned Nicaragua’s expulsion of its citizens, stating that the politically motivated, inconsistent deprivation of its citizens' nationality is against the convention.[37]
In 2019, the EU froze Nicaraguan assets and imposed travel bans on individuals and entities tied to human rights violations and oppressing civil society.[38],[39] These actions aimed to encourage the Nicaraguan government to respect democratic processes and institutions, but the continued human rights violations pushed the European Council to extend restrictive measures until October 2026.[40] In 2020, the UK introduced sanctions specifically targeting Nicaraguan officials and designated individuals, including travel bans, asset freezing, and director disqualifications, which ban subjects from obtaining a director position in a UK company.[41]
GHREN has demanded that the international community take this matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the Convention against Torture.[42] Nicaragua signed and ratified both treaties in 2013 and 2005, respectively.[43] The ICJ has the power to issue a binding judgment if two countries initiate a dispute and give their consent.[44] A country can give its consent directly or by making a reservation on the treaty.[45] Although the ICJ is the designated dispute resolution mechanism for both treaties, Nicaragua has not made reservations for either.[46],[47] Should the UN initiate a procedure at the ICJ, and an advisory opinion is issued directly against Nicaragua, the decision would not be binding.[48]
Several countries, including the US,[49] EU,[50] and the UK,[51] have imposed sanctions on Nicaragua. The US first froze assets and implemented travel bans on Nicaraguan officials complicit in human rights violations in 2018, declaring Nicaragua as a state of emergency during the first Trump administration.[52] In 2022, the Biden Administration extended sanctions to people and groups operating in the gold sector, including a ban on imports and exports of certain goods.[53] Trade between both countries remains stable, with gold representing 21.1% of total exports to the US in 2024, amounting to 785 million USD.[54]
The USA granted the Nicaraguan the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 1999 due to Hurricane Mitch in 1999 that affected many areas and denied many the ability to return to their homes.[55] Nicaraguan TPS was continually active after this incident until 2025, when the Department of Homeland Security terminated the TPS for thousands of Nicaraguans, arguing that the government of Nicaragua had made improvements and built infrastructure in the affected area.[56] However, this decision endangers many of the Nicaraguans who face a double threat of being prosecuted politically and targeted economically as a part of the regime's campaign to silence opposition.[57]
In recent years, Nicaragua has extensively increased its relations with Russia and China, which both have veto power in the UNSC, reducing the likelihood of coordinated action targeting the Nicaraguan regime.[58] Nicaragua has authorized the presence of Russian troops, warships, satellites, and military vehicles in the country under Decree 10-2022, for support and training reasons.[59] Russia and Nicaragua continue to deepen bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors, reinforcing both political ties and economic resilience by providing essential goods, energy supplies, and medical resources.[60] Since 2021, Nicaragua has reestablished relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has supported it by providing vaccines during the Covid-19 pandemic,[61] and promoting cooperation in fields such as economy, people's livelihood, social development, infrastructure construction, and investment.[62]
Analysis
The government of Nicaragua will very likely continue restricting its opponents’ digital presence by blocking or suspending their social media accounts. Such restrictions will likely include technical measures to prevent individuals from creating new accounts, such as IP-based blocking or device identification. The government will likely implement VPN surveillance to track devices and identify individuals criticizing the government via VPN connections, using tools such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to block these users and anti-government content. Political opponents and human rights activists will very likely use unconventional spaces, such as online gaming platforms, to voice their grievances and plan resistance activities. Restrictions on digital space will likely disrupt channels used for political coordination, reducing the visibility of opposition narratives. This will very likely reduce the influence of opposition voices on domestic audiences, thereby disconnecting the public from exiled political opponents abroad. This fragmentation will likely complicate coordination, slow information dissemination, and reduce the ability to reach large audiences, likely limiting coordinated political pressure against the government.
The Nicaraguan regime will likely intensify its intimidation strategies through increased surveillance and threats to force families of exiled nationals, political opponents, and human rights activists to publicly support the government. Families will very likely avoid platforms and gatherings that oppose the regime, with a roughly even chance of assisting officials in identifying anti-government groups to maintain their protection. The government will almost certainly continue to criminalize political activities to prevent the formation of a broad-based opposition and reduce mass protests. There is roughly an even chance that the government will introduce conditional social schemes targeting families of exiled citizens, tied to political compliance.
The Nicaraguan regime will very likely continue to suppress freedom of religion using physical and educational means, specifically targeting the Catholic Church's prominent members and followers of Catholicism, likely attempting to substitute the state as the primary reference. The government will very likely target citizens wearing religious items, such as a crucifix, and restrict religious expression by limiting the availability of religious books and materials in public, likely creating an environment of fear to decrease religious expression. The government will likely attempt to create a taboo about following any religious identity and will likely oppose religious beliefs and practices through state-sponsored campaigns in educational institutions to prevent children from following them. The government will have a roughly even chance of establishing itself as the state religion in its attempt to further weaken the influence of religious institutions, historically the pillars of civil society.
The government will almost certainly continue to target the extended families of political opponents to increase the personal costs of dissent. The children of vocal critics of the government still in Nicaragua will likely face restrictions on documentation, including identity documentation and educational documentation. Such restrictions will likely create significant administrative barriers to access to schooling, healthcare, vaccination programs, social assistance, and other public services, severely impacting basic human rights. The government will likely use these administrative barriers to segregate society and establish consequences for criticizing the government and associating with such critics.
Government restrictions will very likely affect households' income. Senior citizens who are openly critical of the government will likely face increased economic pressure through the suspension or removal of state pensions. Pension withdrawal will very likely constitute a targeted form of coercion designed to undermine the economic stability of those associated with political opposition. There is a roughly even chance that families will accumulate debt for basic needs such as food, housing, and healthcare, contributing to economic difficulty. The ripple effect of reduced pensions will likely increase the financial vulnerability of affected families, making them susceptible to exploitation in search of other income. Families will likely resort to informal economic activities, such as street vending, domestic labor, and agriculture. Some families will likely turn to illegal activities to compensate for lost income, including smuggling networks, black-market trades, and irregular trafficking of goods, likely exposing them to high-risk activities and potential further repression from the government.
The Ortega-Murillo government’s misuse of international policing mechanisms, including the INTERPOL SLTD database, will likely persist, restricting the mobility of many exiled Nicaraguans and preventing them from working, living, and obtaining legal documentation. The risk of deportation or detention by host countries will almost certainly increase due to the lack of valid legal paperwork, and in such cases, those who are forced to return to Nicaragua will very likely face politically motivated oppression, imprisonment, or other forms of persecution. The use of INTERPOL tools will have a roughly even chance of creating a stigma in host countries, reinforcing perceptions of Nicaraguans as security risks and increasing their exposure to social isolation and discrimination. This stereotype will likely prompt some foreign governments to restrict Nicaraguan citizens and exiled nationals from entering their borders, very likely increasing the number of stateless Nicaraguans. An increase in statelessness will likely limit exiled nationals from voicing their political dissent due to security concerns, which will likely impact government criticism on a broader scale. This will almost certainly improve the Ortega-Murillo government's effectiveness at expanding its repression beyond Nicaragua’s borders, through the use of international systems to globalize the targeting of political dissidents.
After the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Nicaraguans in the US, Washington will very likely start deporting the Nicaraguan immigrants, including political opponents, human rights activists, and other critics of the government, which will likely lead to their imprisonment or denial to enter the state. Nicaraguan nationals denied entry to the country will likely feel forced to immigrate illegally to the neighboring country of Mexico or other countries, including Costa Rica and Honduras, to avoid certain persecution in Nicaragua. Such deportations will likely strain these host countries’ resources to resettle them and provide adequate security over time, whilst facilitating Nicaragua’s surveillance and intimidation of exiled dissidents.
Some political dissidents living in Central American countries such as Costa Rica and Honduras will very likely face long-term psychological distress related to the perceived and experienced threat to their lives. These dissidents will likely keep a low profile in host countries due to feeling paranoid of transnational surveillance and constant fear of being deported, causing social withdrawal, reduced productivity in activism, and increased difficulty integrating into civil society. Nicaragua will likely continue to weaponize this trauma using cyber-espionage tools such as malware and phishing to limit victims’ ability to organize and speak up on their experiences, likely making them aware of the government’s presence constantly and feeding into the existing paranoia. This strategy will very likely deter victims from joining international protest movements in fear of retaliation by the Nicaraguan government.
Following the collapse of the Venezuelan government, the Nicaraguan government will very likely strengthen ties with Cuba, relying heavily on transnational surveillance to control its exiled citizens. Intelligence cooperation between Nicaragua and Cuba will very likely increase, specifically aimed at tracking and monitoring dissident networks and opposition figures operating outside the country. A stronger partnership will likely enhance the ability to apply pressure on dissidents abroad and to restructure the opposition's capacity to organize advocacy campaigns from exile. However, despite the likelihood of closer operational cooperation, Nicaragua will likely remain cautious about publicly deepening its alignment with Cuba due to its recent escalation of tensions with the US. The Nicaraguan government, blocking a key pathway for migrants to reach the US from Cuba, will likely avoid provoking a political or economic response from the US in the short-term.
The US and its Central American allies, like El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Panama, will likely impose sanctions on Nicaragua, likely pressuring the Nicaraguan government to take accountability for their human rights violations. The US will likely impose blockades on fuel like refined petroleum and crude petroleum, very likely limiting alternative options for Nicaragua due to the instability in the Middle East. There will be a roughly even chance of the US imposing economic sanctions and tariffs on Central American countries to isolate the Nicaraguan administration from seeking economic and financial help from its regional neighbors.
There is roughly an even chance that neighboring countries, with heightened concerns about the situation, will seek to initiate proceedings at the ICJ to resolve the dispute, despite their diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. There is almost no chance that Nicaragua will consent to the ICJ to resolve such a dispute. It is unlikely that the UN will initiate a procedure for an advisory opinion, as it will almost certainly result in no change from the Nicaraguan regime. Neighboring countries initiating and supporting the ICJ proceedings will likely aim to bring attention to Nicaragua’s situation and raise international awareness, likely seeking to take an initial step towards addressing human rights abuses in Nicaragua and abroad to help in the long term.
Backing from Russia and China will very likely continue to act as a key external buffer protecting the Nicaraguan government from international accountability. In the UNSC, Russia and China will almost certainly veto attempts at legal prosecutions or accountability towards Ortega and his administration. China and Russia will very likely continue to shield Nicaragua diplomatically to protect their significant economic and political interests in the country, including infrastructure development, telecommunications, energy projects, and resource extraction, such as mining concessions. These investments will very likely help maintain domestic stability, strengthen the government’s financial capacity, and mitigate external pressure. Such assistance will likely offset the economic impact of sanctions from Western countries who will likely refrain from stronger intervention against Nicaragua, which will very likely push Nicaragua to deepen its ties with China and Russia.
Recommendations
The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) recommends that ethnic and religious groups and their leaders should maintain harmony amongst the various communities, not be influenced by government propaganda, and resist repression through unanimous solidarity. Community leaders should collaborate with the existing NGO’s, such as Luceros del Amanecer Home Foundation, to educate citizens about their rights and help them understand the importance of freedom of expression. Community leaders should support families of deported or exiled civilians in accessing legal assistance and important financial and educational documentation through NGO networks in case of government restrictions.
The Catholic Church should present itself as an important body advocating against religious repression and seek an open channel with the Ortega-Murillo government to negotiate for the release of religious figures. The Church should conduct continuous but principled dialogue with the government to maintain a balanced relationship and monitor religious repression extensively. Negotiations should aim to ensure religious liberty is established and maintained in the future, and alleviate the current threat that many Church-affiliated members are facing.
States that receive exiled individuals, including Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, and Panama, should protect at-risk groups by creating long-term mobility pathways that expand access to asylum, provide humanitarian visas, and guarantee temporary protection programs. National asylum authorities, with support from the UNHCR in case identification and prioritization, should establish accelerated procedures that fast-track high-risk persons, including journalists, activists, their families, and political prisoners. Governments such as Costa Rica and Honduras should issue clear guidance about proceedings, discourage individuals from engagement with Nicaraguan government proposals to return, and guarantee continued protection status. Countries within the EU and Western States like Canada should assist in these efforts by providing financial support, expanding their current resettlement pathways, and accepting referred high-risk cases.
NGOs providing support to exiled Nicaraguans, like People in Need (PIN) America Latina, should adopt a holistic approach that prioritizes mental health services. These NGOs should prioritize restoring the daily activities of exiled Nicaraguans facing a multitude of problems, such as fear of transnational repression and spying, surveillance of relatives still in Nicaragua, and statelessness, to positively impact their well-being and productivity. NGOs should allocate financial support to Nicaraguans seeking refuge in Central American countries, such as Costa Rica, to meet their basic needs, including food, housing, education, and medical care. They should aim to facilitate the integration of exiled individuals into their new host countries by providing legal assistance in seeking asylum, and medical and mental health support.
National prosecutors across Central American countries should refrain from initiating or supporting legal proceedings against exiled individuals in the absence of credible, independently verified evidence in line with international human rights standards. Judicial bodies should ensure that any legal action is grounded in substantiated evidence that is free from political influence or retaliation. Accountability efforts should prioritize Nicaraguan officials who travel frequently to create lawful opportunities to pursue investigations under applicable legal frameworks while reducing the risk of interference from the Ortega-Murillo regime.
Law enforcement and Customs should encourage an independent vetting system for the personal documentation of the exiled Nicaraguans to prevent political misuse of Red Notices. The UNHCR, in coordination with regional organizations such as the OAS, should administer an independent verification mechanism and should support host countries by reviewing asylum seekers’ documentation. They should aim to distinguish politically motivated charges from legitimate legal claims, reducing the risk of persecution of dissidents from Nicaragua while respecting national sovereignty. They should develop structured information-sharing protocols to prevent abuse of asylum systems by individuals attempting to evade legitimate prosecution.
[1] Nicaragua, generated by a third party database
[2] Serious human rights violations in the context of social protests in Nicaragua, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, June 2018, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/134.asp
[3] Serious human rights violations in the context of social protests in Nicaragua, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, June 2018, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/134.asp
[4] Nicaragua: Government steps up 'ruthless' crackdown during 'clean-up operation, Amnesty International, October 2018, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/knowledge-hub/all-resources/nicaopponents' ragua-government-steps-ruthless-crackdown-during-clean-operation/
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid
[9] Report of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, Human Rights Council, February 2026, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/61/56
[10] Nicaragua: UN Experts uncover corrupt financing of repression and spy network targeting exiles, demand justice and freedom, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/nicaragua-un-experts-uncover-corrupt-financing-repression-and-spy-network
[11] Ibid
[12] Nicaragua Events of 2024, Human Rights Watch, 2025
[13] Nationality and Statelessness, UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
[14] Ibid
[15] The hunted: Nicaraguan exiles try to outrun long arm of Ortega, Reuters, October 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/hunted-nicaraguan-exiles-try-outrun-long-arm-ortega-2025-10-17/
[16] Ibid
[17] Nicaragua: Persecution Beyond Borders, Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, September 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/grhe-nicaragua/2025-09-23-ghren-transnational-violations-en.pdf
[18] Ibid
[19] Ibid
[20] Ibid
[21] Report of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, UN General Assembly, February 2026,https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/61/56
[22] Nicaragua: Persecution Beyond Borders, Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, September 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/grhe-nicaragua/2025-09-23-ghren-transnational-violations-en.pdf
[23] 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nicaragua, US Department of State, 2022,
[24] Nicaragua Events of 2024, Human Rights Watch, 2025
[25] Ibid
[26] 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nicaragua, US Department of State, 2022,
[27] 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nicaragua, US Department of State, 2022,
[28] Nicaragua Events of 2024, Human Rights Watch, 2025
[29] Report of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, UN General Assembly, February 2026,https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/61/56
[30] Ibid
[31] Ibid
[32] Nicaragua Withdraws from UN Human Rights Council, Reuters, February 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-withdrannouncedaws-un-human-rights-council-2025-02-28
[33] Ibid
[34] Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ghre-nicaragua/index
[35] Report of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, UN General Assembly, February 2026,https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/61/56
[36] Ibid
[37] Ibid
[38] Ibid
[39] Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1720 of 14 October 2019 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Nicaragua, EUR-Lex, October 2019,
[40] Nicaragua: Council extends restrictive measures for another year, European Council, September 2025,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nicaragua-sanctions-guidance/nicaragua-sanctions-guidance
[42] More than 20 organizations urged UN member countries to demand that Nicaragua be held accountable for human rights violations, Infobae March 2026,
https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/03/18/ms-de-20-organismos-instaron-a-los-paises-miembros-de-la-onu-a-exigir-que-nicaragua-rinda-cuentas-por-violaciones-de-ddhh/#Echobox=1773847831 (Translated by Google),
[43]Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, UN Treaty Collection, March 2026,
[44] STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, International Court of Justice, June 1945, https://www.icj-cij.org/statute
[45] Ibid
[46] The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, August 1961,
[47] Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, December 1984,
[48] How the Court Works, International Court of Justice,
[49] Executive Order 13851—Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua, The American Presidency Project, November 2018,
[50] Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1716 of 14 October 2019 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Nicaragua, European Union, October 2019,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nicaragua-sanctions-guidance/nicaragua-sanctions-guidance
[52] Ibid
[53] Executive Order 14088—Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Situation in Nicaragua, The American Presidency Project, October 2022,
[54] United States / Nicaragua, OEC, December 2025,
[55] Termination of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status, Federal Register, August 2025, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/08/2025-12688/termination-of-the-designation-of-nicaragua-for-temporary-protected-status
[56] DHS ends temporary protected status for thousands from Nicaragua and Honduras, NPR, July 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/07/07/g-s1-76373/trump-immigration-tps-nicaragua-honduras
[57] Trump to end deportation protections for thousands of Hondurans and Nicaraguans, Reuters, July 2025, https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/trump-terminate-deportation-protection-thousands-hondurans-nicaraguans-us-2025-07-07/
[58] China and Nicaragua’s Deepening Embrace, The Jamestown Foundation, November 2023, https://jamestown.org/china-and-nicaraguas-deepening-embrace/
[59] Nicaragua authorizes entry of Russian troops, planes, ships, AP, June 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-caribbean-nicaragua-mexico-b424de6b64611ba1202fb9e2b634f130
[60] Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, Moscow, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, December 2024 https://mid.ru/es/foreign_policy/news/1986964/?lang=en#11
[61] Nicaragua receives China vaccines after cutting ties with Taiwan, BBC, December 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59633388
[62] China and Nicaragua re-establish ties in blow to U.S. and Taiwan, Reuters, December 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-nicaragua-hold-talks-city-tianjin-following-taiwan-break-2021-12-10/
