RSF SEIZES CONTROL OF AL-NUHUD IN SUDAN, SIMION WINS ROMANIA ELECTION RE-RUN AMID DEMOCRACY FEARS, AND MPOX OUTBREAK SURGES IN SIERRA LEONE WITH 384 CASES IN A WEEK

May 1-7, 2025 | Issue 16 - AFRICOM and EUCOM teams

Ludovica Leccese, Giovanni Lamberti, Meaghan Mackey, Leon Kille, Sophia Schultz, Orane Desilles, Agathe Labadi, Jennifer Radlinsky

Clémence Van Damme, Senior Editor

RSF Takeover of Al-Nuhud[1]

Date: May 2, 2025

Location: Al-Nuhud, West Kordofan State, Sudan

Parties involved: Sudan; Sudanese government;  Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); SAF security patrols and units; Sudanese paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF); RSF loyalists; RSF-aligned youth militias; local tribal figures; Sudanese pastoralist ethnic group the Hamar; Hamar chiefs; Sudanese civilians; local communities

The event: RSF has taken control of Al-Nuhud, intensifying their campaign in central Sudan.[2] 

Analysis & Implications:

• The RSF will likely attempt to install loyal tribal figures or pressure existing ones into compliance, likely eroding customary decision-making structures. Tribal leaders, particularly from groups like the Hamar who experienced targeted killings of their chiefs, will very likely resist these RSF attempts to impose loyalists, likely prompting the paramilitary group to escalate coercive tactics. Because of this resistance, the RSF will likely modify traditional consensus-building processes by directing tribal councils to address RSF priorities ahead of community concerns, likely altering the function of customary governance systems. These altered decision-making structures will likely decrease in standing with local populations as elders become unable to effectively fulfill their traditional roles in mediating disputes and managing resources, very likely creating opportunities for RSF-aligned youth militias to gain influence.

• The RSF's capture of Al-Nuhud will very likely compromise the SAF's strategic position across western Sudan, very likely weakening their territorial control and emboldening them to launch additional offensive operations. This territorial loss will likely impair the SAF's operational capacity by disrupting key supply lines and communications, very likely hampering intelligence coordination and security patrols needed to defend nearby areas. The resulting isolation of SAF contingents in West Kordofan cities such as Babanusa will very likely create optimal conditions for the RSF to implement siege tactics, very likely exploiting the SAF's diminished ability to reinforce or resupply these vulnerable outposts. This will likely prompt the SAF to counterattack RSF forces in Al-Nuhud from Babanusa using ground assaults and airstrikes, with a roughly even chance of regaining control of key southern West Kordofan routes.

• The RSF's capture of Al-Nuhud is likely part of a broader coordinated campaign to consolidate their control in West Kordofan, almost certainly limiting SAF's ability to maneuver their forces across central Sudan. By securing Al-Nuhud, the RSF will likely restrict SAF’s ability to move forces and supplies east-west between Kordofan and Darfur, very likely causing it to rely on longer, more vulnerable routes. This shift will likely reduce SAF's ability to coordinate reinforcements across fronts, as extended supply routes through difficult terrain increase exposure to RSF ambushes and delay tactical response times. These delays and vulnerabilities will likely constrain SAF’s ability to reposition units between operational zones and hinder efforts to reinforce isolated positions promptly, likely increasing the chance of RSF gains in areas with limited support.

Date: May 5, 2025

Location: Romania

Parties involved: Romania; far-right Romanian presidential candidate George Simion; Romanian far-right politician and banned presidential candidate Calin Georgescu; current government coalition National Coalition for Romania (CNR); CNR supporters; centre-left Romanian party Social Democratic Party (PSD); centrist conservative Romanian party National Liberal Party (PNL); PSD and PNL members; far-right Romanian party Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR); Romanian protesters; Romanian officials; Romanian nationalist and pro-EU blocs; Romanian far-right supporters; EU; far-right Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán; far-right Slovakian prime minister Robert Fico; NATO; Ukraine; Russia; Russian-influenced defense firms; Belgium

The event: Simion secured the electoral win in the first round of the presidential election re-run, raising concerns about Romania’s democratic future.[3] 

Analysis & Implications:

• Simion’s preliminary electoral win will very likely cause a timely political reconfiguration of the CNR government, likely deepening divisions between nationalist and pro-EU blocs.  PSD and PNL members of the CNR will very likely resign in protest of recent election results, likely pushing their parties out of government and giving AUR a chance to gain power in a new coalition. There is a roughly even chance that these changes before the runoff will prompt mainstream party supporters to protest, targeting both their party leadership and Simion’s erosion of the pro-Western establishment. Peaceful anti-Simion protests will likely remain limited in scale but have a roughly even chance of facing violence from far-right supporters, likely incited by advocates like Georgescu, aiming to consolidate public backing for Simion after the runoff.

• Simion’s likely presidency will almost certainly weaken Romania’s alignment with EU security and foreign policy, likely raising the risk of it becoming a disruptive actor in Europe and NATO decision-making. Simion’s potential alignment with Eurosceptic leaders like Orbán and Fico will very likely impede European governance in the region, likely obstructing EU consensus on migration, defense, and rule-of-law initiatives. This deviation will almost certainly hamper Brussels’ ability to sustain collective action on Eastern European security, especially amid the Ukrainian conflict, likely creating regional security gaps by straining intelligence cooperation. This erosion of alignment very likely reduces Romanian influence in EU policymaking, likely driving both political isolation and decreased access to European funding mechanisms tied to democratic and legal standards.

• Simion’s potential electoral win will very likely have strategic consequences for NATO in the Black Sea region, likely diminishing joint military operations and exposing the eastern flank to Russian interference. Russia will very likely use Simion’s isolationist rhetoric to counter NATO in the Black Sea, likely persuading Romanian officials to favor Russian-influenced defense firms in coastal projects. An anti-Western Romanian government will be unlikely to address corruption, likely allowing Russia to expand its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) network, disrupting Ukraine's trade routes and enabling smuggling through Romania. Increasing Russian dominance in the Black Sea will likely disrupt communication lines and joint security measures, such as drone surveillance and policing, with a roughly even chance of surpassing NATO’s defense capabilities.

Date: May 8, 2025

Location: Sierra Leone

Parties involved: Sierra Leone; Sierra Leone government; Sierra Leone authorities; Sierra Leona border management teams; Sierra Leone health officials; Healthcare workers in Sierra Leone; Sierra Leone civilians; foreign donors to Sierra Leone's healthcare system; West African health systems;  Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); IDP camps; Guinea; Liberia

The event: Sierra Leone's mpox outbreak, with 384 confirmed cases in a week, is fueling a broader resurgence across Africa and straining local health services.[4]

Analysis & Implications: 

• The mpox outbreak will very likely deepen critical weaknesses in West African health systems, particularly their dependence on external actors, by likely disrupting the allocation of resources across essential services. A sudden reallocation of resources to mpox in countries like Guinea and Liberia, where donor-funded health systems rely on vertical aid, will likely cause cascading service interruptions in areas such as maternal health and HIV treatment. With essential services no longer a priority, avoidable deaths from childbirth complications or untreated HIV infections will likely rise, likely increasing donor dependence while reducing national ownership of health priorities. As reliance grows, external actors will likely take over logistics and clinical expertise, likely increasing the risk of setting health priorities misaligned with national needs.

• The ongoing mpox outbreak in Sierra Leone will very likely face significant detection and containment challenges due to critical gaps in the country’s surveillance and coordination systems. Health workers will likely misclassify or fail to report early cases through fragmented data flows since mpox falls outside established national monitoring programs, very likely preventing authorities from recognizing outbreak patterns. The surveillance gaps in their system will likely disrupt coordination between health officials, local government, and border management teams as they will likely struggle to share accurate case information and implement a unified strategy across jurisdictions. The disrupted coordination will very likely enable the virus to spread undetected through remote districts before national authorities can mobilize an effective response operation to contain the outbreak.

• The mpox outbreak will likely expand throughout West Africa as violence and political instability force civilian displacement, very likely creating good conditions for disease proliferation. Civilians crossing borders to escape regional clashes will likely enter overcrowded IDP camps, likely spreading mpox to new countries and increasing the mortality rate from the disease. The humanitarian difficulties within these camps, such as limited food and water access, will very likely weaken civilians' immune systems, while crowded living conditions and poor sanitation will very likely accelerate disease transmission. These combined factors will likely create pockets of high mpox infections throughout West Africa, very likely exacerbating the regional health crisis.

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[1] Regional conflict, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)

[2] Sudan’s RSF paramilitaries seize strategic West Kordofan city Al-Nuhud, Sudan Tribune, May 2025, https://sudantribune.com/article300391/#google_vignette 

[3] Hard-right candidate Simion secures decisive win in first round of Romania’s presidential redo, AP, May 2025, https://apnews.com/article/romania-election-presidential-crisis-e6ce0a674cf88bfc02c505482dc2497b

[4] Sierra Leone's mpox cases fuel African outbreak, health body says, Reuters, May 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/sierra-leones-mpox-cases-fuel-african-outbreak-health-body-says-2025-05-08/