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THREAT CLIMATE ASSESSMENT: DUTCH HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS PRONE TO SOCIAL MEDIA DISINFORMATION ON THE HOLOCAUST. AI CONTENT LIKELY DEEPENS YOUNG GENERATIONS’ SUSCEPTIBILITY TO REVISIONIST NARRATIVES

  • 2 days ago
  • 9 min read

Jaydn Burgin, Sofía Vilas, Chiara Michieli, Leon Kille, EUCOM Team

Alexia Andrica, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor; Jennifer Loy, Chief Editor

May 6, 2026 

Youth and Social Media[1]


BLUF

Reliance on social media and AI-generated content is increasingly shifting Dutch students’ understanding of the Holocaust away from factual, classroom-based learning toward misinformation and fabricated historical narratives.[2] The Dutch educational environment previously relied on institutionally supported Holocaust education, vetted academic materials, and traditional media sources as the primary basis for historical understanding.[3] The growing influence of algorithm-driven social media platforms and AI-generated content will very likely accelerate students’ exposure to misleading Holocaust-related narratives and weaken trust in verified historical information. Teenagers’ continued reliance on engagement-driven platforms such as TikTok and Instagram will likely normalize credibility assessments based on viral content, peer reinforcement, and engagement cues rather than source verification. Growing circulation of AI-generated misinformation will likely increase pressure on schools and educators as misleading historical narratives increasingly enter classroom discussions and online youth spaces. Continued exposure to manipulated historical content and the spread of misinformation across less-regulated online spaces will very likely weaken institutional historical authority and trust in verified educational material over time. The degradation of trust in institutionally supported Holocaust education will likely deepen younger generations’ susceptibility to revisionist historical narratives and complicate long-term efforts to preserve accurate Holocaust knowledge in the Netherlands.


Introduction

High school students in the Netherlands are significantly susceptible to online disinformation on the Holocaust, including AI-generated historical falsifications.[4] Among interviewed teachers, over 58% reported encountering instances of misinformation on the Holocaust among their students.[5] Teenagers are increasingly relying on online platforms, especially TikTok and Instagram, with 65% of Europeans aged 15 to 24 using social media as their main source of information.[6] This reflects a generational change in which younger students grow up within social media environments instead of traditional news channels, relying on high-speed, high-engagement formats.[7] Changing news consumption patterns are linked to continuous and growing digital peer pressure, where group chats, algorithmic feeds, and constant notifications encourage ongoing engagement with these platforms and reduce the separation between online and offline information environments.[8]


Students interact daily,[9] including for school projects, with generative AI tools and chatbots, whose lack of data and potential built-in bias could produce false information on the Holocaust.[10] Extensive reliance on AI-powered tools makes them particularly vulnerable to online disinformation, as malicious actors exploit reported algorithmic bias[11] to disseminate false and misleading claims through viral content,[12] relying on teenagers’ limited fact-checking abilities.[13] The Dutch government has begun exploring regulatory measures to combat youth exposure to misinformation, with a majority in the House of Representatives supporting proposals for age restrictions on social media use.[14] 


Analysis


Technology

Students’ belief in false Holocaust content is likely becoming more frequent under the influence of generative AI’s increased capabilities in appearing more reliable and impartial than traditional disinformation content. In the previous information environment, actors spreading Holocaust denial and conspiracy theories strived to present themselves as legitimate figures to distort historical facts without sounding outwardly antisemitic. They used social media platforms to amplify their message by posting openly anti-historical content, such as videos from famous denialists and memes ridiculing accepted historical facts as partisan narratives. Now, the extensive use among high school students of generative AI tools, such as chatbots, including for educational purposes, is very likely expanding the reach of false claims about the Holocaust. Students likely indiscriminately trust information obtained through such instruments and perceive AI chatbots as authoritative and impartial sources, very likely absorbing misleading data and bringing it to class. Large Language Models’ reported built-in biases very likely confirm users' pre-existing opinions, likely reinforcing biases among young students. Teenagers’ reliance on perceivedly authoritative AI-powered chatbots will very likely increase exposure to online Holocaust disinformation. This will likely challenge existing verified academic material from educational institutions by offering allegedly equally credible content, with a roughly even chance of encouraging students to question teachers’ expertise and existing school curricula. There is a roughly even chance that ideologically controversial actors, such as far-right politicians, will increasingly employ AI-generated content to engage with prospective younger voter bases, likely increasing biases, extremist views, and partisan postures that limit constructive confrontation in schools.

Online disinformation is very likely shifting from being relatively easy to identify to increasingly convincing and indistinguishable from factual content. Previously, online publications spreading disinformation generally included cues that made them easier to identify as fake, such as low-quality images with visible inconsistencies. Requiring a more technical skill, only a few users were able to easily produce and distribute convincing false information. The rapid evolution of AI content creation tools is very likely contributing to online disinformation appearing more realistic. The current sophistication level of generative AI in creating Holocaust-related deepfake images is very likely near-realistic enough to mislead many students and create false perceptions of events, such as trivializing prisoner deportations. Widespread access to these digital tools is very likely increasing the frequency with which social media users encounter AI-generated content spreading Holocaust disinformation or misleading claims. Social media algorithms, which prioritize engagement over accuracy, are very likely exposing vulnerable users to this content and providing them with misleading credibility signals, such as account popularity or like counts. Students will very likely continue to struggle with identifying false Holocaust disinformation independently on the internet, likely being susceptible to manipulation. There is a roughly even chance that repeated exposure to the same information will increase its perceived credibility over time, likely creating an illusory truth effect. This misperception will contribute to the development of ingrained false beliefs in affected teenagers, likely becoming increasingly difficult to correct.

Social

Teenagers’ evaluation of Holocaust information is likely shifting from reliance on traditional sources recommended by educational institutions toward greater influence from social media publications. Students in previous generations acquired historical knowledge mainly through vetted sources encountered during institutional learning, such as educational textbooks, documentaries, and traditional media sources. Social media usage among earlier generations remained comparatively limited, reducing reliance on online platforms for educational and historical information. Students currently attending high school very likely experience social pressure to conform to modern societal norms, prompting them to use social media platforms like TikTok and Instagram as their primary sources of information. This behavior is likely shaping their historical knowledge intake and overall learning experience. Increasingly relying on these media to conform to group expectations, coupled with platform algorithms and business models that amplify engaging content, likely causes information overload and reduces the time students spend verifying historical information. The growing use of engagement cues such as comments, likes, and account popularity to judge credibility very likely encourages intuitive credibility assessments rather than critical evaluation of content’s origins and accuracy. This growing dependence on social media will likely increase teenagers’ exposure to Holocaust disinformation and misleading historical narratives through socially reinforced online environments. Peer groups and online communities will very likely normalize repeated consumption and sharing of unverified historical content among youth audiences. Engagement-driven platform interactions and algorithms that prioritize highly engaging material will likely enhance the visibility and circulation of misleading historical narratives. The continued social reinforcement of these behaviors will likely enable false narratives to spread more rapidly into classrooms and broader youth discussions, sustaining the erosion of trust in institutionally supported historical knowledge.


Political

The Dutch government is likely moving from a legally constrained role in regulating media content to enhanced support for measures restricting youth exposure to disinformation on social media. The Netherlands operated under a system in which constitutional protections for freedom of expression and independent regulatory bodies limited direct government oversight of media content. Media governance primarily relied on existing media regulations and independent oversight bodies, with little direct involvement in addressing disinformation on social media. Dutch policymakers are likely to raise efforts to address exposure to disinformation among youth by proposing regulations targeting harmful content on social media platforms. The majority in the Dutch House of Representatives supporting measures such as age restrictions on social media platforms likely encourages policymakers to advance stricter oversight of platform accessibility and youth engagement with online content. Deepened government involvement will very likely reshape the information environment encountered by students. These measures will likely limit some direct exposure to disinformation through increased regulation of harmful online content. In the short term, partial or delayed implementation will likely create enforcement gaps that allow disinformation to continue spreading across platforms despite policy efforts. Over time, regulatory pressure will likely drive disinformation into less regulated spaces such as encrypted messaging platforms, smaller online forums, and alternative social media platforms, sustaining the broader threat to historical accuracy and societal understanding.


Recommendations

  • The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) recommends that the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science (OCW) introduce strong online prebunking measures to warn students of potential Holocaust disinformation attempts. This should include publishing short and engaging videos in the ministry’s official social media accounts and other official government online communication channels that provide examples of possible disinformation tactics. The ministry should strengthen prebunking measures in the days prior to relevant historical anniversaries, when false or misleading content tends to spread more.  

  • The ministry should accelerate the requirement for high schools to include digital literacy in their curriculum, focusing on identifying false or manipulated information, and ensure its implementation is mandatory and uniform across all schools. The ministry should offer funded, mandatory training for teachers to develop the necessary skills to evaluate sources and identify indicators of content manipulation.

  • The Primary and Secondary Education Department at OCW should amend the current informatics curriculum for middle and high school students to provide theoretical and practical knowledge of the nature and dangers of generative AI in textual information, and to educate about the limitations of AI-powered tools.

  • New OCW guidelines should encourage local schools to discuss AI-related misinformation at bi-annual parent-teacher conferences to ensure the safety and well-being of their children and reduce strain on teachers during classes, particularly with sensitive historical topics.

  • OCW should coordinate with secondary schools, youth organizations, and digital education specialists to expand classroom-based discussion initiatives and peer engagement activities that encourage students to critically discuss and contextualize Holocaust-related content encountered on social media.

  • OCW’s Education Executive Agency (DUO) should facilitate the development of long-term partnerships between schools, museums, historical institutions, digital media literacy organizations, and Holocaust remembrance organizations to strengthen youth engagement with institutionally supported historical education through online educational campaigns, interactive content, and verified historical resources.

  • The ministry should establish recurring national coordination forums with lawmakers, educators, technology regulators, and historical institutions to assess emerging Holocaust-related disinformation trends and evaluate potential policy responses targeting youth audiences online.  

  • Dutch schools and technology regulators should cooperate with OCW to establish centralized reporting and escalation procedures for disinformation-related classroom incidents and harmful historical content targeting youth on social media platforms.


Threat Climate Assessment

Analysis indicates a HIGH PROBABILITY of the threat climate degrading from reliance on institutionally supported Holocaust education to increasing dependence on social media and AI-generated content for historical understanding, resulting in growing youth exposure to misinformation and historical falsification. The rapid expansion of AI-generated content and algorithm-driven social media platforms will VERY LIKELY accelerate the degradation of students’ ability to distinguish factual historical information from misleading or fabricated narratives, LIKELY making them prone to manipulation from internal and external actors. Teenagers will LIKELY continue to rely on social media platforms for historical information, while peer reinforcement, engagement cues, and intuitive credibility assessments will VERY LIKELY normalize repeated exposure to unverified Holocaust-related narratives. Lacking sufficient historical knowledge and source-verification skills on significant historical facts, such as the Holocaust, each student will LIKELY favor narratives more in line with their political and personal beliefs, with A ROUGHLY EVEN CHANCE of developing increasingly partisan interpretations of historical events. These beliefs will LIKELY become difficult to challenge, straining school staff and prompting the need to address misleading historical narratives, verify online sources, and manage misinformation-related classroom discussions. Dutch policymakers will LIKELY continue supporting measures aimed at reducing youth exposure to harmful online content, although enforcement limitations and the spread of misinformation into less-regulated online spaces will VERY LIKELY sustain the broader threat environment. The continued normalization of manipulated Holocaust-related narratives will LIKELY weaken students’ trust in institutionally supported historical education, with A ROUGHLY EVEN CHANCE of increasing acceptance of conspiracy-oriented or partisan interpretations of historical events, potentially limiting schools’ ability to maintain a shared understanding of verified historical truth over time.

[1] Social media platforms offer children exciting but frightening environments, by Eric Pilgrim, licensed under Public Domain (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of War (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD/DoW endorsement.)

[2] Students bring misinformation about the Holocaust into the classroom: 'They see it on TikTok', NOS, May 2026, https://nos.nl/artikel/2612848-leerlingen-komen-met-desinformatie-over-holocaust-de-klas-in-zien-ze-op-tiktok (Translated by Google)

[3] “Youth, news and social media: A look at the future of news,” Commissariaat voor de Media, 2024, https://www.cvdm.nl/documents/3127/Youth-news-and-social-media-summary.pdf 

[4] Students bring misinformation about the Holocaust into the classroom: 'They see it on TikTok', NOS, May 2026, https://nos.nl/artikel/2612848-leerlingen-komen-met-desinformatie-over-holocaust-de-klas-in-zien-ze-op-tiktok (Translated by Google)

[5] Ibid

[6] Youth survey 2024, Eurobarometer, January 2024, ​https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3392 

[7] Teens shun traditional news channels for TikTok and Instagram, Ofcom says, BBC, July 2022, ​​https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-62238307

[8] Re-examining adolescent social media use and socioemotional well-being through the lens of the COVID-19 pandemic: A theoretical review and directions for future research, Perspectives on psychological science, November 2021, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9081105/ 

[9] AI and the Holocaust: rewriting history? The impact of artificial intelligence on understanding the Holocaust, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2024, https://doi.org/10.54675/ZHJC6844 

[10] Ibid

[11] Artificial intelligence and algorithmic bias? Field tests on social network with teens, Technological Forecasting and Social Changel, April 2024, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2023.123204 

[12] TikTok algorithm promoted anti-Semitic death camp meme, BBC, July 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53327890 

[14] Parliamentary majority for age limit on addictive social media, NOS, March 2026, https://nos.nl/artikel/2558169-kamermeerderheid-voor-leeftijdsgrens-gebruik-verslavende-sociale-media (Translated by Google)

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